From Gujrat to Greece
The deadly dream of Europe
Families are liquidating their pasts to buy a lottery ticket to the bottom of the sea. One household parts with its tractor, another signs away generations of ancestral land, and a third borrows at crippling rates against a hollowed-out future, all to fund the shadowy illegal passage known as dunki. This is not a flight from absolute starvation. It is a desperate, calculated auction of life savings, driven by peer pressure, social prestige, and the crushing conviction that staying in Pakistan is a dead end.
Actual scale of irregular migration remains hidden behind clandestine networks, leaving no reliable district-wise records. However, data from border agencies and human rights watchdogs offer a glimpse into the trend. European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) estimates that roughly 150,000 Pakistanis have entered Europe irregularly since 2009. While National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) recorded 8,778 Pakistani arrivals in 2023, that number dropped to about 5,000 in 2024. Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) figures, citing Frontex, show a continued downward trend, recording a 26 percent decline in 2025 and a steep 64 percent drop during the first two months of 2026. Crucially, these figures represent only detected arrivals at European borders, not the total volume of attempts.
Official data only deepens the ambiguity. Federal Investigation Agency blocked nearly 70,000 departures across 2023 and 2024, while roughly 40,000 Pakistanis were deported home in 2023 alone. Beyond the intercepted and the expelled, annual estimates of irregular departures swing wildly, ranging from 80,000 to 100,000 according to Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, up to a staggering 300,000 to 400,000 in other accounts.
One chilling estimate even places monthly movement through Duki, Balochistan, at around 35,000 people. Because these figures remain unreconciled, they cannot be treated as hard totals; instead, their massive divergence lays bare a grim reality, an entire exodus unfolding in the dark, documented only by its failures.
The geography of irregular migration reveals a stark concentration. Punjab dominates the documented networks, with Central Punjab serving as the epicentre, particularly Gujranwala, Gujrat, Mandi Bahauddin, Hafizabad, Sialkot and Jhelum, alongside Sheikhupura, Toba Tek Singh, and Bhimber in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Recent official assessments indicate that roughly 90 percent of identified trafficking victims hail from just five districts of Jhelum, Gujrat, Mandi Bahauddin, Gujranwala, and Sialkot. State crackdowns reflect this hotspot map, with wanted human smugglers and asset seizures heavily clustered around towns like Pasrur, Kharian, Hellan, and Kamoke.
This deep geographic concentration suggests that dunki is rarely an isolated choice that operates through entrenched networks of agents, intermediaries, and community enablers. Yet, formal legal emigration tells a broader, structured story. Punjab also accounts for the lion’s share of registered overseas employment, representing 56.7 percent in 2023, followed by KP at 24.4 percent, Sindh at 8.4 percent and Balochistan at just one percent. In raw volume, 2024 saw hundreds of thousands legally leave through official bureaus including over 404,000 from Punjab, 187,000 from KP, and 60,000 from Sindh. While these figures provide essential context on labour mobility, they must not be confused with the illicit, underground mechanics of dunki.
Perhaps the most telling paradox of this crisis lies in the economic profile of those making the journey. Research by the IOM and NCHR reveals that unemployment sat below two percent across the five central Punjab districts studied, with multidimensional poverty remaining under 20 percent in most, Mandi Bahauddin being the sole exception at 31 percent. Yet, smuggling a person to Europe carries an astronomical price tag of roughly $11,926, or Rs 3.3 million. To scrape this together, families liquidate their standing: one household in Jora, Gujrat, reportedly sold its Toyota Hiace for Rs 4.5 million, while others strip away ancestral land, gold jewellery, and life-accumulated assets.
These sacrifices challenge the assumption that extreme poverty alone drives dunki. In many communities, migration has become a measure of social mobility and personal success. A successful migrant’s remittances can turn an otherwise dangerous journey into an attractive investment in the eyes of neighbours and relatives. The fear of being left behind reinforces the cycle, even when families understand the risks.
This desire to leave, however, extends far beyond Punjab. NCHR data shows that roughly 40 percent of Pakistanis want to migrate, with the strongest inclination recorded in Balochistan, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan (42 percent), followed by KP (38 percent), Sindh (37.6 percent) and Islamabad (36.5 percent). Inflation, political instability, unemployment and bleak economic prospects have made migration an aspiration across provincial boundaries. Yet, the geography of aspiration is not the same as the geography of irregular migration. While the urge to escape may be strongest in the country’s more deprived regions, Central Punjab has developed the financial capacity, established overseas connections and entrenched smuggling networks that make the dangerous journey more accessible. This explains why the region dominates documented dunki cases despite not necessarily having the strongest desire to migrate.
The human cost of this exodus is catastrophic. The June 2023 Pylos shipwreck off Greece claimed 207 Pakistani lives, followed by another Mediterranean tragedy in December 2024 that killed 25. The disasters continued in 2025 and 2026, with boats carrying Pakistani migrants sinking off Morocco and Libya. FIA records put the death toll at 335 Pakistanis across seven shipwrecks since June 2023. The danger extends beyond the Mediterranean. The IOM recorded 109 Pakistanis dead or missing along irregular migration routes worldwide in 2025 alone. Increasingly, exploitation has spread to Southeast Asia, where 24,922 Pakistanis travelled to Cambodia between 2024 and 2026, with 3,312 failing to return. Many are feared to have fallen into organised criminal networks operating fraudulent cyber-scam compounds.
The state cannot arrest and deport its way out of this crisis. Since June 2023, FIA has registered 2,421 human-smuggling cases and arrested 3,130 suspected smugglers, while freezing properties worth nearly Rs 962 million. More than 100 agency officials have also faced disciplinary penalties for facilitating illegal migration. Yet arrests and airport crackdowns alone cannot dismantle an industry sustained by powerful networks, financial interests and official complicity. The state must follow the money, confiscate the proceeds of trafficking, prosecute facilitators and hold complicit officials accountable, regardless of rank or position.
Ultimately, enforcement must be matched by opportunity. Research from Lahore School of Economics warns against border restrictions that push desperate migrants towards traffickers rather than safer alternatives. Pakistan needs transparent overseas recruitment, affordable legal migration procedures, enforceable protections for migrant workers and stronger bilateral labour agreements. It must also address the economic insecurity and loss of confidence that make leaving appear more attractive than staying. Without these changes, the business of dunki will survive every crackdown, adapting its routes, changing its agents and finding new victims. More families will mortgage their futures, more young people will disappear into foreign waters or criminal networks, and Pakistan will continue to lose its human capital to a journey that begins with hope and too often ends in tragedy.
内容来自 Pakistan Today,版权归原作者所有。
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