In the new world order, the world is without a referee

The US and Israeli attack on Iran exposed the whole worlds 

In April 2026, Washington and Tehran sat across the negotiating table in Islamabad for the first direct high-level talks between the two countries in more than a decade. Pakistan had become an intermediary in a war it had neither initiated nor could control. The negotiations revealed something more consequential than the diplomatic emergence of a middle power. The world’s most powerful military could initiate a war but could not independently secure the peace, while the international institutions established to prevent such conflicts remained peripheral to the arrangements intended to resolve them. The old international order was losing its authority, but no credible replacement had emerged.

The Iran war, now in its ninth month, has exposed the contradictions of an international order increasingly governed by power rather than rules. The USA can still wage war on a scale no other country can match, but its military superiority has not translated into political control. Its February 28 strikes with Israel killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, yet Tehran retaliated by closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of global oil supplies passed before the conflict. An April ceasefire collapsed, a subsequent memorandum failed to secure a lasting settlement, and President Donald Trump urged countries dependent on Hormuz to help secure the waterway themselves. The world’s principal security guarantor was asking others to protect a vital international shipping route.

The deeper crisis is institutional. The United Nations was created after the Second World War to prevent international peace from becoming hostage to the ambitions of individual powers. Its Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states, while the Security Council is entrusted with maintaining international peace and security. The Council did act on the Iran conflict, adopting Resolution 2817 on March 11, which condemned Iranian attacks on Gulf countries and reaffirmed freedom of navigation through international waterways. Yet a resolution could not restore normal shipping or produce an enforceable settlement. The Council’s permanent members have competing interests, while the veto gives five countries a privilege unavailable to the rest of the international community. International law has not disappeared. What has eroded is the willingness and ability of powerful states to submit their actions to its authority. Rules still exist, but their enforcement increasingly depends on the power and identity of those who violate them.

The conduct of other major powers offers little reassurance. Russia and China have not intervened militarily to defend Iran, despite their strategic relationships with Tehran and allegations of Russian intelligence and technological assistance. Both have sought to protect their economic and geopolitical interests without assuming the military costs of defending Tehran. Neither appears willing to accept the risks of confrontation with Washington in defence of an international principle. The emerging order is not a stable balance among competing powers but a competition in which each major state seeks advantages while avoiding responsibility for the wider consequences.

Middle powers, meanwhile, are increasingly negotiating their own arrangements. Pakistan carried a US 15-point proposal to Tehran and helped facilitate the April ceasefire. Qatar and Oman pursued their own diplomatic channels. On August 7, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed a mutual defence agreement, adding a new layer to the region’s evolving collective security arrangements. These developments demonstrate diplomatic flexibility, but they also reveal the fragmentation of collective security. When countries must negotiate separate guarantees, bilateral exemptions and individual passage arrangements, universal rules lose practical authority. Iran’s reported decision to exempt selected countries, including India and China, from restrictions on Hormuz shipping illustrates the problem. Freedom of navigation, a principle of international law, increasingly risks becoming a privilege granted through political bargaining.

Freedom of navigation cannot depend on the goodwill of whichever country controls a strategic coastline, just as sovereignty cannot depend on the military strength of the state exercising it. A world in which every country must bargain separately for rights already guaranteed by international law is not a new world order. It is the return of power politics without the restraints that the post-war settlement was designed to establish.

This transactional order is particularly damaging for countries without comparable leverage. With 81 percent of its fuel imports originating in GCC countries, Pakistan remains particularly exposed to disruptions in Gulf energy supplies. Rising energy costs feed directly into transport, food prices, industrial production and household budgets. For poorer importing countries, an international crisis becomes a domestic economic emergency. Wealthier states can draw on financial reserves, alternative suppliers and diplomatic influence. Low-income economies have far less room to absorb the shock. The consequences of geopolitical disorder are therefore distributed as unequally as the power that produces it.

The consequences extend beyond the Gulf. China, India, Japan, South Korea and Pakistan all depend on uninterrupted maritime trade and energy supplies, yet have little control over decisions that threaten them. Their interests may differ, but they share a compelling reason to protect freedom of navigation. Rather than form another military bloc, they should work with Gulf states to establish a common framework for maritime security, mine clearance, shipping insurance and emergency energy reserves. The United Nations should provide the institutional framework, ensuring that freedom of navigation is governed by common rules rather than political concessions.

Pakistan’s diplomatic role also illustrates the limits of influence. Hosting negotiations brings visibility and access, but not the power to enforce agreements or establish international rules. Islamabad cannot guarantee the reopening of Hormuz, just as Washington cannot secure a lasting peace through military superiority. Pakistan should use its diplomatic standing to promote a rules-based maritime arrangement rather than mistake its role as a mediator for authority over the outcome.

A new international order cannot be built through competing alliances, selective exemptions and bilateral bargains. Nor can it survive if the strongest countries reserve the right to interpret international law according to their interests while demanding compliance from everyone else. The world does not need another declaration of principles without the means to uphold them. It needs institutions capable of holding powerful and weaker states to the same standards.

Freedom of navigation cannot depend on the goodwill of whichever country controls a strategic coastline, just as sovereignty cannot depend on the military strength of the state exercising it. A world in which every country must bargain separately for rights already guaranteed by international law is not a new world order. It is the return of power politics without the restraints that the post-war settlement was designed to establish.

内容来自 Pakistan Today,版权归原作者所有。

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