Fighting against Local Councils
The fight over policing
AT PENPOINT
With local body elections in KP up in limbo because of Governor’s Rule and polls at last in the Punjab, it has become clear that national and provincial legislators are still involved in a struggle with local councillors over ensuring control over decision-making.
The essential problem is one of neatness. Where is power supposed to vest? The problem is that both legislators and councillors are outside the chains of command that all government servants fit into. Even where there is a political master (like a chief minister or a prime minister), then legislators and councillors may compete with one another for influence with that master. Then the power is dependent on the relationship of the councillor with the CM. The CM depends on MPAs for survival in office, so local councillors depend on their MPA to convince the CM.
Because the elections are not held regularly, the English tradition of using these elections as a bellwether is not used. While local elections have now become party-based, they are very local, just as national or provincial polls are. In all parties, but particularly the PML(N), applicants for national and provincial tickets usually claim the support of local councillors to demonstrate their electoral clout.
At the same time, MNAs and MPAs have failed to develop a clear symbiotic relationship with their local councillors because of this irregularity of election. Provincial and national elections can take place earlier than five years, but since 2013, the assemblies have usually run for a full term. Not so the local councils.
Local councils have a longer history than assemblies, but one the assemblies came, the councils were not exactly replaced, but decreased in importance. One reason was that provincial subjects were more important than those handled by councils. It is worth noting that councils are empowered to exercise some of the provincial government’s functions, and in the past, upto the 1960s, they did. Local councils ran schools and dispensaries, but found them difficult to run, mostly because of the salary burden. The schools and dispensaries were taken over by the provincial governments. The councils were also permitted to raise their own police forces, but this did not happen.
Finally, there is the paradox of local councils being enshrined in the Constitution. No matter the difficulties they create, if they are not in place, the Constitutional apparatus is not complete. However, it is the Constitutional Court which has to ensure that all provinces obey the Constitution, or else the provinces will not give up power without a struggle.
Policing seems to be the main problem, though revenue is a close second, more because it involves ownership records rather than anything else. Municipal police forces are the norm in the UK and USA, but here it seems that the colonial model is maintained, of a province-wide force, The force is province-wide, but was put under the control of district nazims in the Musharraf Martial Law, which tried to devolve powers from the provincial governments down to the districts.
Part of the issue is the purpose of policing. Whoever becomes Chief Minister of a province wants to use it to protect friends and persecute enemies. However, a CM’s friends and enemies, though many, are limited, and there are whole swathes of territory where he or she has no problem with anyone. However, in that area, the local MNA or MPA has both friends to protect and enemies to persecute.
Therefore, the MPA’s support is basically tied to his or her ability to get police cooperation. That has sometimes meant that CM has handed over the district’s policing to a particular member, who might also have a seat in the federal or provincial cabinet. Musharraf’s National Reconstruction Bureau had the idea of placing the police under the district nazim.
That meant the IGP posted officials, which the nazims didn’t really mind, because they wanted to ensure their power over the Station House Officers, and for that they did not need the DSPs and above, so long as they left the SHOs in place, and did not take the side of the opponents in the cases they were interested in, such as by ordering that justice should be done.
The PTI claimed that it would dispense justice, and indeed that was the name of the party, but as their candidates wanted the police to obey them instead of their predecessors, the policing system remained unchanged. The problem is that of control. Politicians do not seek having the police left to act as it will, but to bring its control down to their level. The proposal of putting the district police under a public security commission has been made, but not implemented.
Such a system would require that the police service be split up into separate forces for separate districts. As a matter of fact, upto the rank of head constable, policemen are recruited from a particular district, and will only serve there. If they become upper subordinate officers, up to the rank of DSP, they become liable to serve anywhere within the province. As a matter of practice, officers may serve in a more limited area, because by that time they have developed the sort of localized knowledge that is essential to good policing, apart of course from the kind of familial responsibilities which make them want to put down roots.
Thus, in a province-wide force, one can threaten a police officer with a transfer to the boondocks if he does not improve his performance (or overlook a particular crime by a supporter of his political master). In a district-wide force, the worst threat that can be made is to transfer him from one corner of the district to another. And what does one do with the district police chief? An SP of a bustling district near the capital can be sent to another end of the province, to what is essentially an overgrown village, with different policing problems. He cannot be transferred out of a district if he is the police. An IGP, for example, cannot be transferred, except to the federal government, which will then post him somewhere. However, no CM can get rid of an IGP by transferring him to another province.
Something of the same effect is sought by the creation of more provinces, and it is to be noticed that the idea is being pushed by the same forces that wanted the district government system. Though that system also devolved education and health downwards, along with such subjects as irrigation and revenue, it should also be noted that it also meant a divorce between local councils and assemblies. The Ayub and Zia Martial Laws had allowed members to hold both local and provincial or national office, which meant that some people held dual office. This was prohibited when the Zia Martial Law was lifted, a prohibition retained by the Musharraf Martial Law.
Despite the problems legislators have with local councils, no one has ever come out against them. Legislators have an ambivalent attitude, mainly because they have an educational value. The concept of ghar ki seat (home seat) also exists, and it is a taunt during election campaigns that a candidate could not win even his ghar ki seat without party/biradari support. Local councils provide contests that are consolation prizes for supporters. Someone who aspires to a provincial seat but do not quite dare, settle for local council seats.
Finally, there is the paradox of local councils being enshrined in the Constitution. No matter the difficulties they create, if they are not in place, the Constitutional apparatus is not complete. However, it is the Constitutional Court which has to ensure that all provinces obey the Constitution, or else the provinces will not give up power without a struggle.
内容来自 Pakistan Today,版权归原作者所有。
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