An expert in espionage on spies, honeypots, and Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang

Nvidia announced early Thursday morning that CEO Jensen Huang had resigned from the company. The updates come after reports that Huang had been having affairs with an alleged Chinese spy, as well as an executive who reported to him at the company. The scandal has spurred myriad national security concerns and sent Nvidia stock tumbling.

For the chipmaker—which sources some 80% of the world’s GPUs—Huang’s exit marks the loss of an executive who led the company through an AI craze and to record profits. But for the United States, and the tech industry more broadly, the scandal raises concerns about ongoing attempts by spies to steal valuable intellectual property and compromise the country’s leading technology executives.

“I can vouch for the lack of concern by senior executives about such matters,” Matt Brazil, an expert in espionage now writing about the topic and a former U.S. Army officer, corporate security investigator, and expert control official, told Fast Company. “They will freely spend money to increase revenue but are far less enthusiastic about outlays to protect revenues, reduce losses, or promote security awareness.”

Brazil, who is also a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, a global analysis firm, emailed with Fast Company from Melbourne, Australia about the prevalence of honeypot schemes, the threat of espionage to tech companies, and what steps boards take to investigate their top executives. 

This email interview has been edited for length. 

How common are these kinds of honeypot schemes, particularly those backed by the Chinese government and targeting American tech executives?

Unfortunately, they may be very common. For example, there are parallels in this case with the problem from a decade ago involving the Chinese agent—or officer—Christine Fang.  Ms. Fang targeted California and other politicians and used sexual exploitation to gather information and build influence. However, this case regarding [Alice Huang, the leader of Singapore-based Megaspeed and alleged spy for the Chinese government] was potentially far more successful because of who Jensen Huang is, what he knows, his access to technology, and his connections, including in Silicon Valley and with the White House.

What do you imagine the target was: Nvidia intellectual property, classified intel from the Trump administration, or a voice in Washington in favor of loosening chip restrictions? Something else?

The target could be all of the above. If Ms. Huang had access to Jensen’s devices during an overnight stay, all of the above could have been compromised because there is no telling what was on his phone and laptop hard drive. A national-level security agency could have given her devices to quickly copy a hard drive in the time it takes for Jensen to be in the shower. As someone who regularly texted the president, his devices could have practically anything because of Mr. Trump’s habit of sharing sensitive information with those he trusts.   

What kind of training and oversight do tech executives have to prevent this kind of stuff?

Very little unless there is leadership from the top to spend the money and time needed to train executives. From nearly two decades in international business, I can vouch for the lack of concern by senior executives about such matters. They will freely spend money to increase revenue but are far less enthusiastic about outlays to protect revenues, reduce losses, or promote security awareness. They are very conservative about thorough background investigations, for example, except for a few “positions of trust” that generally are connected to revenue (i.e. the CFO). The people who handle technology and operations tend to be trusted until they violate the company’s code of conduct.

Are you warned about honeypots and other similar espionage schemes when you get security clearance? Is this something company boards require—or should require?

Yes, people in government are trained about this threat. Company boards need to consider a paradigm change in their priorities and requirements of management on these issues. More training is needed, more monitoring of behavior, and more resources should be allocated to corporate security departments. There is a tendency to view security and background checks as “cost centers,” versus revenue centers such as manufacturing, sales, design, and marketing. That is the mentality that has helped lead us all to this moment.

Does Nvidia’s market concentration—the company might have as much as 80% of the GPU market—make the risks associated with these kinds of honeypot schemes worse? 

Yes, just because of who and what they are. 

内容来自 Fast Company,版权归原作者所有。

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