第一章哲学并非阐释(第1–3、48节)Part03

Philosophy Is Not Explanation (§1–3, 48) Part03

  《黑格尔论伪哲学》第一章 哲学并非阐释(第1–3、48节)Part03

Against Explanation

    驳斥阐释

A typical preface tries to provide “eine Erklärung” or an explanation of the book’s contents. Hegel notes (in §3) that prefaces are problematic because the author tries to explain the content of the book from the outside instead of “forgetting” or losing herself in the content, the Sache selbst. Hegel does not explicitly discuss “explanation” at length in the preface but he does explore the word in more depth elsewhere.

    标准序言试图提供“一种阐释”,也就是对著作内容的外部说明。黑格尔在第三段指出序言的核心弊病:作者从外部阐释著作内容,而非沉浸、消融于内容,也就是事情自身。黑格尔并未在序言中大篇幅详述阐释的本质,但在其他文本中展开过深入剖析。

§48 A.V. Miller

§48 贺麟,王玖兴

In “Force and the Understanding,” Hegel notes that explanations [Erklärungen] are tautological. An explanation of lightning explains the event by saying it is an instance of the law of electricity and justifies the law of electricity by saying that it is what explains an event of lightning (W3:124; §154). An explanation does not unfold from attention to the movement of the content; rather it is applied top-down. Explanation does not provide satisfaction by deepening our understanding of nature. Instead, Hegel says, it satisfies us for another reason:

    在“力与知性”章节,黑格尔提出一切阐释都是同义反复。用电力规律解释闪电,再用闪电现象佐证电力规律,循环往复(全集第3卷,第124页,第154节)。阐释并非顺着内容自身的运动推演生成,而是自上而下套用到内容之上。阐释不会深化我们对事物的理解,从而带来真正的思想满足;黑格尔提出,阐释之所以让人产生满足感,另有根源:

The reason why explaining affords so much self-satisfaction is just because in it consciousness is, so to speak, communing directly with itself, enjoying only itself; although it seems to be busy with something else, it is in fact occupied only with itself. (W3:133; §163)

    阐释之所以能带来充足的自我满足,是因为意识在阐释过程中,仿佛直接与自身共处,只享受自身;看似在处理他者,实则只与自身打交道。(全集第3卷,第133页,第163节)

Hegel treats explanations as subjective satisfactions. Explanations are not discoveries; they are translations. The satisfaction afforded by a “good” explanation is the satisfaction of aligning two accounts that were previously considered to be separate. Explanation satisfies us because it translates something that seems foreign into familiar language. If I am familiar with electrical charge, I am satisfied by the explanation of lightning in terms of electrical charge.  Explanation is not dialectical: it does not force us out of our comfort zone or negate our familiar assumptions. In fact, it does just the opposite. Because Hegel has reason to believe that thinking works by negation, by disorientation and alienation, he views explanation as a problematic procedure which gives the appearance of thinking where no thinking (no dialectical transformation of a content from within) is taking place.

    黑格尔将阐释视作主观层面的自我满足。阐释并非新知发现,只是话语转译。一套“优质”阐释带来的满足感,是将两套原本割裂的论述相互对齐。阐释之所以令人安心,是把陌生之物转译为我们早已熟稔的话语。倘若我们熟悉电荷概念,用电荷解释闪电便会心生满足。阐释不具备辩证属性,不会迫使我们跳出舒适区、否定固有偏见;恰恰相反,它只会加固既有认知。黑格尔认为,思维依靠否定、错位、异化推进,因此阐释是一套充满弊病的路径:它制造出思考的假象,却没有发生任何内在的辩证转化。

Teachers witness the danger of explanation all the time. What a teacher often provides for students are translations of strange texts into terms they already understand, a process which bypasses the challenge of the material altogether.  This transaction has the potential to satisfy both parties because it gives the appearance of change and growth when actually the challenging content is just being reduced to an already available content.

    教师日常教学时刻能见证阐释的危害:教师常把晦涩文本转译为学生早已掌握的术语,直接绕开文本本身的思想挑战。这套交换看似两全其美,看似带来认知成长,实则只是将充满挑战性的内容,简化为学生早已熟知的旧内容。

A typical preface is a good example of the tautology of explanation. A preface takes the unfamiliar content of the book and translates it into a familiar language that is considered the property of the general reading public.  Prefaces, Hegel tells us, should explain why the author “wrote the book” and how the book relates to other books past or present “on the same subject” (W3:11, §1). The author is expected to take the work and relate it to his personal biography and to the other books that have already been published.  Both procedures translate hard-won insights into the language of prevailing prejudices about philosophy. If, for example, most readers view philosophy as a contest between empiricism and rationalism, a preface must situate the work in relation to those terms, even if both are discovered to be misleading within the work itself.

    标准序言正是阐释同义反复的典型例证。序言将书中陌生内容,转译为大众读者熟悉的通用话语。黑格尔提出,序言理应阐释两点:作者“著书的初衷”,以及本书与古今同主题著作的关联(全集第3卷,第11页,第1节)。作者需要将整部著作,关联自身生平、关联已出版的各类典籍。两种操作,都是将历经艰苦求索才得到的洞见,转译为大众对哲学的固有偏见。举例而言,倘若多数读者将哲学视作经验论与唯理论的对峙,序言就必须以这套二元框架定位本书,即便全书内部会揭示这套划分本身具有误导性。

The generally accepted opinion is that a preface should appeal to a broad audience and make philosophical thinking more accessible. But Hegel argues it does just the opposite. Prefaces substantially obscure philosophy itself and teach us to accept substitutes for it. Prefaces prepare us for dogmatism and formalism, and their externally justified claims, rather than philosophy which is always self-justifying, self-presenting, and has its element in the self-moving concept.  Prefaces cannot reach the Sache selbst (the content as an end in itself) because they try to explain it (and this treats content as a means or instrument).

    大众普遍认为,序言应当面向广泛读者,简化哲学思考、降低门槛;黑格尔却提出事实截然相反。序言大幅遮蔽哲学本身,教我们接纳哲学的替代品;序言培育独断论与形式主义,培育依托外部佐证的各类主张,而非永远自证、自我呈现、依托自我运动概念展开的真正哲学。序言无法抵达作为目的本身的“事情自身”,因为序言的方式是阐释,将内容视作工具、手段。

Prefaces as Subjective Satisfactions

    作为主观自我满足的序言

Explanation does not explore a given content on its own terms, but quickly ties it back to already available terms. Thus it is not surprising that those with ample experience in a certain area are not necessarily good at explaining it. For the experienced, each consideration leads to another and the whole network cannot be severed at will and served up in convenient chunks. Proper appreciation for the subject matter tends to bring with it a dissatisfaction with tidy explanations, since one begins to feel how limited and limiting they are. We seek explanations when we seek “self-satisfaction” instead of the challenge of patient immersion in a disorienting and difficult content.

    阐释不会依照内容自身的尺度探究内容,而是迅速将内容挂靠到我们早已掌握的现成概念之上。因此不难理解,在某一领域深耕多年的行家,未必擅长阐释该领域。对行家而言,每一层思考都通向另一层,整套思想脉络无法随意切割、拆成便于阅读的碎片。真正吃透研究对象的人,反而会抵触工整简化的阐释,因为他们能直观感受到阐释的局限与束缚。我们追寻阐释,本质是追求主观自我满足,而非沉下心,直面晦涩、颠覆固有认知的内容,耐心钻研。

As explanations and thus as subjective satisfactions, prefaces do not and

cannot adequately condense philosophical content; they rather summarize

an author’s intention. But what the author thinks he has done is unimportant

when our concern is with what thinking has actually been done in the book.

The author’s intention may be close or it may be far from what the book actually

presents but since we cannot know how close or far until we engage the content

for its own sake, such assurances provide no help up front.

    作为阐释、作为主观满足的序言,无法充分凝练哲学内容,只能概括作者的写作意图。但我们关注书中真实开展的思维活动时,作者自以为完成的工作无关紧要。作者的意图与文本实际呈现的内容或许贴合,或许相距甚远;不亲身钻研内容本身,我们无从判断二者差距,因此序言里的意图说明,前置层面毫无助益。

If anything, a statement of intention proves a substantial obstacle or distraction

in philosophy. Instead of focusing on the argument itself, we will be looking to

see if the argument serves Kant’s or Locke’s stated intention. We might consider

how the lack of prefaces or biographical and historical material allows the reader

to engage a Platonic dialogue more directly and philosophically. Unless one reads

them to confirm an orthodoxy (e.g., a doctrine of the forms), one is always at sea

in these dialogues, suspended in the content with no easy summary or intention

available. Plato himself is conspicuously absent as a character. Platonic dialogues

often begin in medias res and often end in aporia or myth. This forces the reader

to take each turn of the conversation as it comes and not subordinate them all

to a claim that can be stated upfront. This lack of context forces the reader to

be at work thinking. This feeling of being at sea is what Hegel calls “forgetting”

ourselves in the issue, content, or matter itself, the “Sache selbst”:

    非但无用,写作意图的陈述,反而会成为哲学研究的巨大阻碍、分散注意力。我们不再聚焦论证本身,转而考察这套论证是否贴合康德、洛克公开宣称的写作意图。我们可以对比柏拉图对话:无序言、无生平历史材料,读者才能更直接、更哲学地研读文本。除非读者阅读对话只是为印证固定正统学说(例如相论),否则总会陷入思想悬置,没有现成摘要、作者意图可供依托。柏拉图本人作为叙述者彻底隐身,对话常中途切入,结尾往往陷入无解困境或是神话叙事。这迫使读者顺着对话的每一处转折推进,不能将全部论述归束为一段前置抛出的论断。这种无预设语境,迫使读者全程主动思考。这种悬置无依的状态,正是黑格尔所说的消融自我、沉浸于事情、内容本身,也就是“事情自身”:

Instead of grappling with the Sache, this sort of procedure [prefacing] is always

already beyond it; instead of lingering with the Sache and forgetting itself in it,

this sort of knowing always gropes after some Other but stays much more with

itself than it ever [stays with] the Sache or gives itself over to it. (W3:13, §3)

    这类序言式的处理方式,不直面事情本身,永远置身事外;不肯停留于事情、消融自我,这类认知永远追逐外在他者,关注自身远胜于关注事情,无法全然交付、沉浸于事情之中。(全集第3卷,第13页,第3节)

The key insight here is that when we seek explanations of philosophical works like prefaces, we believe that we are getting something different, something other than we already had, but in fact this procedure can only tell us what we already know. It is because we are deceived about what is going on here that we do not seek to remedy it. We believe explanations advance or expand our knowledge when they merely pass the buck to some explanatory term we already accept. In Kantian terms, we think explanations involve synthetic judgments but they are merely analytic. No new path for thinking has been forged.

    此处核心洞见:当我们依靠序言阐释哲学著作时,自以为收获全新认知,实则这套操作只能复述我们早已知晓的内容。我们看不清这套机制,因此不会主动修正。我们误以为阐释拓展、更新了知识,实则只是将问题推诿给另一套我们早已接纳的阐释术语。以康德哲学术语来讲,我们以为阐释是综合判断,实则只是分析判断,没有开辟任何全新的思维路径。

From Explanation to Presentation [Darstellung]

    从阐释走向呈现

What we cannot represent/imagine [vorstellen], we can and must perform

[darstellen].20

—Friedrich Schlegel

  无法直观表象之物,我们必须以践行的方式呈现。

  ——弗里德里希·施莱格尔

Instead of giving an external explanation [Erklärung] of knowing, Hegel’s systematic work (i.e., not his prefaces) aims to give an immersive performance or immanent presentation [Darstellung] of it. The 1807 preface opens with a critique of prefaces because they are extraneous. Hegel then avoids using the word “explanation” to describe his own book (though he will use the word to describe the book’s preface), preferring instead to call the Phenomenology of Spirit a “Darstellung” (e.g., W3:22, 38, 55, 72, 79). Hegel’s Phenomenology is not a “Kritik” or an “Entwürf” or an “Erklärung” but a “Darstellung” of phenomenal knowing. In the preface, we learn that the “authentic presentation” of philosophy is a “speculative presentation” or a presentation that presents dialectical movement itself as the central subject matter, as opposed to those works that concern fixed propositions, finite objects, or categories (W3:61, §65).

    黑格尔的整套科学体系(区别于序言),不提供对认知的外在阐释,而是带来沉浸式、内在的**呈现(Darstellung)**。1807年序言开篇批判序言,正是因为序言属于外在附加之物。黑格尔全书不会用“阐释”定义《精神现象学》自身(尽管他用这个词形容序言),更愿意将《精神现象学》称作“呈现”(全集第3卷,第22、38、55、72、79页)。我们从序言中得知,哲学本真的呈现是“思辨式呈现”,这类呈现将辩证运动本身作为核心议题,区别于那些固守固定命题、有限客体、抽象范畴的著作(全集第3卷,第61页,第65节)。

Hegel’s first advertisement for his book offers a telling contrast between presentation and explanation. Here, Hegel describes the Phenomenology as a presentation and his preface as an explanation:

    黑格尔为本书撰写的首篇出版预告,清晰对比了呈现与阐释的差异。黑格尔将《精神现象学》定义为呈现,将序言定义为阐释:

This volume presents [darstellt] knowing becoming knowing [das werdende Wissen]. The phenomenology of spirit should step in the place of psychological explanations [Erklärungen] or abstract considerations of the foundation of knowing. . . . In the preface, the author explains [erklärt] himself about what seems to him to be the need of philosophy at its present standpoint: further about the presumptiveness and nuisance of philosophical formulas that are currently devaluing philosophy, and about what belongs generally to philosophy and to the study of philosophy. (W3:593)

    本卷呈现生成过程中的认知。精神现象学应当取代对认知的心理学阐释,或是对认知根基的抽象思辨……在序言中,作者阐释自身,说明当下哲学所处阶段提出的内在需求,同时批判当下贬损哲学的各类空洞哲学公式,一并阐释哲学与哲学研习的普遍内涵。(全集第3卷,第593页)

The presentation here is of das werdende Wissen as it presents itself. It should replace “psychological explanations” of Wissen made from outside. Presentation, in Hegel’s usage, is always immanent. Presentation is self-presentation. It is not the author’s presentation but the content’s self-presentation. An explanation, as we saw, turns out to be a catalog of the author’s prejudices. Presentation assumes nothing about the content and allows every important expression of that content a chance to present itself. The author’s work, then, is to help guide the reader through those expressions.

    此处的呈现,是让生成中的认知自行展露自身。它取代从外部做出的各类认知心理学阐释。黑格尔语境下的“呈现”永远是内在的,是事物的自我呈现,而非作者的主观展示;前文已经说明,阐释只是堆砌作者的固有偏见。呈现不对内容预先设立任何预设,给予内容所有关键表达自我展露的空间;作者的工作,只是引导读者遍历这些内容的内在展开。

In the presentation, Hegel makes no mention of himself as author or his own view. This is only discussed in the preface to the book and even there is it minimized and problematized (see §17 and 72). This suggests something about how we should read the book as presentation and the preface as explanation.  We should not expect the private views of the author in the rest of the book and, conversely, we should not expect the preface to be a self-justifying presentation.  In short, it is a serious hermeneutic error to read the preface and the book in the same way.

    在呈现的正文之中,黑格尔几乎不提及自身、自身观点;相关探讨仅存在于序言,即便序言中,作者身份也被弱化、解构(参见第17、72节)。这也为我们区分两种阅读方式提供依据:阅读正文当作呈现,阅读序言当作阐释。以解读序言的方式解读全书,是严重的阐释学谬误。

Hegel writes:

The inner necessity that knowing be science [daß das Wissen Wissenschaft sei] lies in its nature, and a satisfactory explanation of this can only be the presentation of philosophy itself. (W3:14, §5)

    黑格尔写道:

    认知成为科学的内在必然性,根植于认知自身的本性;对这一必然性令人满意的阐释,只能是哲学本身的呈现。(全集第3卷,第14页,第5节)

This compact expression illuminates the relationship between the Phenomenology and its preface. The sentence relates four terms: knowing [Wissen], science [Wissenschaft], explanation [Erklärung], and presentation [Darstellung]. We could rephrase Hegel’s sentence as follows: just as private knowing must become collective knowing, the explanation of knowing from the outside must become an immanent presentation of knowing.

    这句凝练的论述,点明《精神现象学》与序言的关系。句子包含四组核心概念:认知、科学、阐释、呈现。我们可以转述黑格尔的这句话:正如个体零散认知必须走向普遍的集体认知,从外部对认知做出的阐释,也必须转化为认知内在的自我呈现。

The Phenomenology of Spirit should help us to transform our naive

assumptions about the proper content of philosophy. Before reading it, we are

likely to think that philosophy concerns reasonings about subjects and objects

and their relations. After reading it, we should recognize that the division

between subject and object is untenable and that both are moments in movements

which turn out to be the true content of philosophy. Subject and object are not

basic, fundamental terms. Hegel captures this inversion in a memorable image:

philosophy asks natural consciousness to “walk on its head” (W3:29, §26).

    《精神现象学》旨在重塑我们对哲学固有内容的朴素预设。阅读之前,我们多半认为哲学是围绕主体、客体及其关联展开的推理;读完之后,我们会认清主客二分本身站不住脚,主体与客体都只是运动之中的环节,而这套运动才是哲学真正的内容。主体与客体并非基础、本源范畴。黑格尔用一个极具画面感的比喻概括这份认知翻转:哲学要求自然意识“倒立行走”(全集第3卷,第29页,第26节)。

To put this in standard Hegelese: subjects and objects are only moments in a movement that generates and also sublates them. This does not mean individual persons are disregarded by Hegel in favor of some vague, impersonal absolute entity. This means, rather, that the personhood of persons is to be understood, ontologically, as doing, as activity, as self-movement [Selbstbewegung], rather than as some passive substance or static essence. The “I” is not some persisting thing or substance, but is only its activity of relating itself to itself (through actions like sensing, digesting, thinking, etc.). If subjects are what they do and so-called objects are only objects in and for some kind of doing, then the subjectobject relation is subordinate to the activities that require them as moments.  We see both “I” and “other” emerge as problematic terms in the course of the Phenomenology, because they fixate on moments of a single selfing activity that involves both I-ness (self identity) and other-ness (self difference) in reciprocal interchange. I realize this language may not be very illuminating to new readers and ask for their patience as we gradually work with Hegel’s new way of exploring the subject-object relation, which will be the major theme of Chapter 4.

    以标准黑格尔术语表述:主体与客体,只是一套生成并扬弃二者的运动之中的环节。这并非说黑格尔无视个体人,推崇某种模糊、无个性的绝对实体;而是说,人的人格性,从存在论层面应当被理解为活动、自我运动,而非被动持存的实体、静态本质。“自我”并非固定持存之物、实体,仅仅是自我关联的活动(感知、消化、思考等各类活动)。倘若主体由自身活动定义,所谓客体,也只是某类活动之中、为该活动存在的客体;那么主客体关系,从属于催生二者作为环节的各类活动。我们在《精神现象学》全书会看到,“自我”与“他者”都会逐步暴露自身的问题:二者固化了单一自身性活动之中的环节,这套活动同时包含自身同一(自我)与自身差异(他者),二者相互往复、彼此转化。我明白这套表述对初学者而言晦涩难懂,还请读者耐心,我们会逐步熟悉黑格尔这套探讨主客体关系的全新思路,这也是第四章的核心议题。

Because the Phenomenology is an immersive presentation it will not be persuasive for the reader who prefers external explanations. This preference may appear as an inability to see a difference between explanation and presentation. Hegel writes the preface precisely to address this reader. We need to be prepared for the system of science by the Phenomenology that addresses natural consciousness, but we likely need to be prepared for the Phenomenology by a preface that addresses our desire for explanations (which would subvert the work of the Phenomenology before it even gets going).

    《精神现象学》是沉浸式的内在呈现,偏好外在阐释的读者难以从中获得说服力;这份偏好,往往体现为无法区分阐释与呈现。黑格尔撰写这篇序言,正是为了回应这类读者。我们需要经由《精神现象学》接触自然意识,做好进入科学体系的准备;但我们多半需要先经由这篇序言,消解对阐释的执念——这份执念甚至会在我们研读《精神现象学》之前,就消解全书的价值。

Transforming the Desire for Explanations

    转变对阐释的欲求

As we have seen, Hegel argues that prefaces are typically explanations of the books they preface. In all likelihood, the reader picked up Hegel’s book seeking an explanation of “Hegel’s viewpoint,” not an immersive encounter with philosophy, reason, or thinking itself in which Hegel himself aimed to disappear.

    前文已经阐明,序言通常是对著作的阐释。读者拿起黑格尔这本书,多半是想要一份对“黑格尔立场”的阐释,而非沉浸式直面哲学、理性、思维本身(黑格尔本人则希望在文本中隐去自身)。

Prefaces keep us supplied with pre-philosophical understandings of the external differences between philosophies and thus prevent us from grasping the unity of philosophy as an activity that underlies them. We use prefaces, textbooks, and other external discussions to keep our Descartes separate from our Locke and both separate from our Aristotle. But if philosophy is one selfsame activity and these are all examples of it, we run the constant risk of losing the integrity and unity of philosophy by discussing it in this external way. If we begin to think that these partitioning explanations are philosophy itself, we will lose any hope of ever practicing it. Instead of providing an easier entry into philosophy, a preface can actually bar the way altogether. A preface often teaches us how to categorize works of philosophy, not how to think philosophically.

    序言不断向我们灌输哲学之间外在差异的前置认知,阻碍我们把握哲学作为统一活动的内在一体性。依靠序言、教材、各类外部评述,我们会把笛卡尔、洛克、亚里士多德割裂看待。但倘若哲学是同一套统一活动,这些都只是这套活动的不同表达;以这种外在割裂的方式讨论哲学,我们随时会丧失哲学的完整统一。倘若我们误以为这套分割式阐释就是哲学本身,便永远无法践行哲学。序言非但不会简化哲学入门路径,反而会彻底阻断通路。序言教会我们如何分类梳理哲学著作,而非如何进行哲学思考。

In this light, the first important transformation required in order to practice philosophy is a transformation in desire. The reader must undergo a change from desiring explanations to desiring presentations. Hegel’s 1807 preface hopes to persuade us to give up our desire for prefaces to philosophy and seek out complete presentations of thinking’s expressions, a system of science. Hegel’s preface employs a variety of means to effect this transformation of desire. He shames us for wanting easy answers, he jokes and jabs at the different character types that fall afoul of philosophical thinking while claiming to practice it, and he invites curiosity by offering riddle-like suggestions about the true nature of philosophy.

    由此观之,想要践行哲学,首要的内在转变,是转变自身的欲求:读者必须从渴求阐释,转向渴求呈现。黑格尔1807年序言试图说服我们放下对哲学序言的执念,转向完整呈现思维全部表达形态的科学体系。黑格尔运用多重方式促成这份欲求转变:令执着于简易答案的读者心生羞愧;调侃、驳斥各类自称研习哲学、实则偏离哲学思考的人格类型;抛出谜语般的提示,勾起读者对哲学本真本质的好奇。

Choosing to read Hegel’s system of science is not a matter of being convinced in advance that Hegel’s “method” or results are true when compared to those of other philosophers. It is rather a matter of accepting that philosophy can offer no advance assurances and that any assurances offered on its behalf in this way are perhaps interesting but philosophically irrelevant. Hegel’s preface does not promise an understanding of philosophy; rather it attacks our faith in promises when it comes to philosophy. Hegel’s preface does this by exploring what philosophy is not, what it cannot possibly be if it is to answer to our human need for a transparent, rational community (see §69). When Hegel takes away our other options, we are expected to turn toward the self-presentation of philosophy in earnest.

    选择研读黑格尔的科学体系,并非预先信服黑格尔的“方法”或结论优于其他哲学家;而是接纳一个事实:哲学无法预先给出任何担保,任何前置担保即便有趣,在哲学层面也毫无价值。这篇序言不会许诺让读者读懂哲学,反而消解我们对各类许诺的信赖。序言通过剖析“哲学不是什么”完成这一点:倘若哲学要回应人类对透明、理性共同体的需求,便绝不可能是这些形态(参见第69节)。当黑格尔逐一排除所有替代路径,我们才会真正转向哲学的自我呈现,踏实钻研。

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