战争和权力的新物理规律
If I were writing a book about the U.S. war with Iran, I know exactly what the title would be. It would be President Trump’s social media post of April 5, 2026, directed at the leaders of Iran: “Open the [expletive] Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell — JUST WATCH!”
如果要写一本关于美国与伊朗战争的书,我很清楚书名会是什么。那将是特朗普总统2026年4月5日在社交媒体上对伊朗领导人的喊话:“打开那个[脏话]海峡,你们这些疯狂的混蛋,否则你们将活在地狱里——等着瞧吧!”
Wars are a crucible that very often exposes changes in the physics of the world around us — who has power, who doesn’t have power and how power is being wielded. Nothing better captures the new power equation produced by this war than Trump’s unhinged and obscene rant at the Iranian leadership for not bending to his bombs.
战争就像一个熔炉,常常揭示我们周围世界的力量格局变化——谁拥有权力,谁没有权力,权力如何被运用。面对没有被他的炸弹吓倒的伊朗领导人,特朗普发出失控而粗鄙的咆哮,没有什么比这更能揭示这场战争所催生的新权力等式。
This new physics of war is equally present in the conflicts between Ukraine and Russia, Hezbollah and Israel, Hamas and Israel and the Houthis and everyone else. My summary of this new dynamic is that the small can now act really big, really accurately and really inexpensively. And while the big can also act really small, really accurately, it is far more expensive for them to do that while bearing the burden of vast legacy arms systems.
这种新的战争规律同样存在于乌克兰与俄罗斯、真主党与以色列、哈马斯与以色列、胡塞武装与其他各方的冲突中。我对这种新动态的概括是:小角色如今能以极低成本、极高精度开展极具规模的行动。大角色虽然也能以极小规模、极高精度行动,但对他们而言,这样做要昂贵得多,因为他们有着庞大的传统武器系统的负担。
The net advantage, for the moment, seems to be to the small. That should keep you up at night, when you think how the emerging revolution in artificial intelligence will surely supercharge this trend, enabling the small to act even bigger, mightier and less expensively.
就目前而言,净优势似乎在小角色一方。这应该让你夜不能寐才对,因为想到正在兴起的人工智能革命必将进一步加速这一趋势,让小角色能以更低成本做出更大、更强有力的行动。
It’s not surprising that Trump is frustrated. After all, on March 11, less than two weeks after he and Israel started this latest bout of war with Iran with a large-scale bombing campaign, Trump declared: “We’ve won. Let me tell you, we’ve won. You know, you never like to say too early you won. We won. In the first hour it was over. But we won.”
特朗普感到沮丧并不奇怪。毕竟,在3月11日——即他和以色列以大规模轰炸行动开启对伊朗的最新一轮战争后不到两周,特朗普就宣称:“我们赢了。让我告诉你们,我们赢了。你知道,你从来不喜欢过早说赢了。我们赢了。第一个小时就结束了。但我们赢了。”
He was right about one thing: Never say you won too early.
他说对了一件事:永远不要过早说赢了。
Trump didn’t realize that the Iranian government also has a say in when this war is won and lost. More important, and unlike Trump, Tehran had a Plan B for the morning after: use its newfound ability to act big, accurately and cheaply to seize control of the Strait of Hormuz — even though its military was a small fraction of the size of America’s and had been badly hammered.
特朗普没有意识到,伊朗政府对于这场战争何时输赢也有发言权。更重要的是,与特朗普不同,德黑兰为次日早晨准备了B计划:利用其新获得的“大规模、高精度、低成本”的行动能力夺取霍尔木兹海峡的控制权,尽管其军力跟美国相比微不足道,且已遭受重创。
I wish I could take delight in seeing our pompous, narcissistic, constantly bloviating president humbled by reality. But I truly do not — because this is getting scary. And it is going to get worse. The Iranians have inflicted real harm on America — on the battlefield and on our economy — the scale of which Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have been hiding.
我希望能幸灾乐祸地看到我们这位自负、自恋、不断夸夸其谈的总统被现实打脸。但我做不到——因为情况正变得可怕,而且会变得更糟。伊朗人对美国造成了实实在在的伤害——在战场上和经济上,特朗普和国防部长皮特·海格塞斯一直在隐瞒损失的规模。
Iran has been under economic sanctions, on and off, since 1979. Yet it has managed to develop an arsenal of sophisticated but relatively inexpensive missiles and drones that has enabled it to fight both Israel and the United States to something of a draw — and do some significant damage to American military assets in the region along the way. Consider just a few stories that you may not have noticed.
自1979年以来,伊朗时断时续地遭受经济制裁。然而它仍成功研制了精良且相对廉价的导弹和无人机库,使其能够与以色列和美国在某种意义上打成平手,并在此过程中对该地区的美国军事资产造成重大破坏。只需要看看以下几则你可能没留意到的新闻。
The reason the main U.S. aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf, the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, has sometimes run low on supplies to sustain its almost 5,700-person complement is that after the first day of the war, Iranian missiles and attack drones destroyed much of the U.S. supply base in Bahrain. “As it went up in smoke, so did a major logistics hub that the Navy has relied on for decades,” The Times reported. This forced Trump and the even more smug Hegseth to increase reliance on a base under British command on the island of Diego Garcia as its supply hub, which is roughly 2,700 miles from Bahrain. How was the Bahrain base so unprotected against Iranian missiles on the first day of the war? If that is not worth hauling Hegseth before Congress, I don’t know what is.
美国在波斯湾的主力航母“亚伯拉罕·林肯”号有时会补给不足,难以维持其近5700名人员的需求。这是因为,伊朗导弹和攻击无人机在开战第一天就摧毁了美国在巴林的大部分补给基地。时报报道写道,“随着基地被毁,海军依赖了数十年的主要后勤枢纽也一同消失。”这迫使特朗普和比他还要自鸣得意的海格塞斯不得不更多依赖迪戈加西亚岛上由英国控制的基地作为补给枢纽,该岛距离巴林约2700英里。巴林基地在开战第一天为何如此无力抵御伊朗导弹?如果这都不足以让海格塞斯到国会接受质询,那我不知道什么才行。
Or maybe you missed this story in the journal Defence Security Asia commenting on a CNN report that sometime in the early days of March, an Iranian missile destroyed a $500 million radar vital to running a THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) advanced missile defense system at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. The attack signaled “a potentially transformative moment” in the “strategic contest” between Iran and the United States and Israel, the journal said.
又或者你错过了《国防安全亚洲》杂志对CNN报道的评论:3月初某日,伊朗一枚导弹摧毁了约旦穆瓦法克·萨尔蒂空军基地价值5亿美元的雷达,后者对运行“萨德”(末段高空区域防御)先进反导系统至关重要。该杂志称,此次袭击标志着伊朗与美国和以色列“战略对抗”中的一个“可能成为转折点的时刻”。
A senior Jordanian official told me he was stunned to learn that the Iranians somehow managed to send their missile at the THAAD’s radar system by maneuvering it — in flight — to make a flanking attack on the radar and evade detection and interception. This was against the most sophisticated antimissile system in the U.S. arsenal!
一位约旦高级官员告诉我,他震惊地得知,伊朗人竟设法让导弹在飞行中机动,对萨德雷达系统实施侧翼攻击,从而规避探测和拦截。这针对的是美军武器库中最先进的反导系统!
John Arquilla, professor emeritus of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, explained to me that missile warfare is no longer just a matter of firing off a warhead on a predictable trajectory and then letting inertia and GPS smart guidance systems lead it to the target. The Russians have focused enormous resources on building missiles with midflight maneuverability, guided by better real-time information, increasingly propelled at hypersonic speeds, and capable of arriving from an angle a defender has not anticipated. Iran’s Fattah missiles reportedly have such capabilities, although it is still not clear whether they or drones took out the THAAD 500 miles from Iran.
美国海军研究生院国防分析荣休教授约翰·阿奎拉向我解释说,导弹战不再仅仅是按可预测弹道发射弹头,然后让惯性和GPS智能制导系统将其引向目标。俄罗斯已投入巨资建造具有中途机动能力的导弹,由更好的实时信息引导,越来越多地以高超音速推进,并能以防御方意想不到的角度抵达。据报道,伊朗的“法塔赫”导弹也具备此类能力,但目前尚不清楚是导弹还是无人机在距离伊朗约800公里处摧毁了萨德系统。
“This is making the missile the pre-eminent weapon of the 21st century, with the potential to undermine deterrence and stability” in many different kinds of battles, said Arquilla, the author of the new book “The Troubled American Way of War: From Hiroshima to the Age of Algorithms.”
“这让导弹成为21世纪的首要武器,可能在许多不同类型的战斗中削弱威慑和稳定,”阿奎拉说。他是新书《陷入困境的美国战争方式:从广岛到算法时代》的作者。
China has been deploying maneuverable hypersonic DF-17 missiles for several years now in its live-fire exercises in Chinese waters near Taiwan.
中国近年来已在台湾附近中国水域的实弹演习中部署了可机动的高超音速DF-17导弹。
On March 3, two one-way attack drones struck the U.S. Embassy compound in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, at about 1:30 a.m. The first drone flew straight into the floor housing the C.I.A. station at the Riyadh embassy; the second drone flew directly into the entry hole created by the first, causing an extensive blast and a fire that burned for hours. Later reports suggested this Iranian attack may have been aided by Russian satellite intelligence provided by Vladimir Putin. Trump has seemingly done nothing about that.
3月3日凌晨1时30分左右,两架单向攻击无人机袭击了位于沙特阿拉伯利雅得的美国大使馆院落。第一架无人机径直飞入利雅得大使馆内中央情报局驻地所在楼层;第二架无人机飞入第一架撞出的洞口,引发大爆炸和持续数小时的大火。后续报道表明,这次伊朗袭击可能得到了弗拉基米尔·普京提供的俄罗斯卫星情报支持。特朗普对此似乎毫无作为。
For generations, Arquilla noted, wars were “won by mass and energy.” Warfare followed a simple physical law: The more distance you fired your projectile, the less accurate it was. So, distance had to be overcome “with mass and energy.” Not today. “Now wars are won by information,” said Arquilla.
阿奎拉指出,几代人以来,战争“靠质量和能量取胜”。战争遵循一条简单的物理定律:射程越远,精度越低。因此必须“用质量和能量”来克服距离的劣势。如今不同了。“现在战争靠信息取胜,”阿奎拉说。
And even the little guys now have access to it. You just have to look at how Hezbollah has inflicted significant harm on Israeli communities and the Israeli Army, with its huge U.S.-made military platforms; how badly Ukraine has bloodied a big bad Russia; and how Iran is fighting the United States and Israel to a stalemate to see how inexpensive, precision weapons buildable in a basement workshop with components that can be found on Amazon have severed the old link between range and accuracy.
就连小角色如今也能获得信息。只需看看真主党如何给拥有巨量美制军事平台的以色列社区和军队造成重大伤害、乌克兰如何重创了庞大而凶恶的俄罗斯,以及伊朗如何与美国和以色列打成僵局,你就能明白,那些可在作坊里用亚马逊上能买到的零件制造的廉价精确武器如何切断了射程与精度之间的旧有联系。
Ukraine, Arquilla added, “has become a sea power without a traditional navy. It has used drone boats and armed Jet Skis” to push Russia’s conventional Black Sea fleet far enough away from Ukraine’s coastline so it can keep exporting its grain and fertilizer to world markets.
阿奎拉补充说,乌克兰“在没有传统海军的情况下成为了海上力量”。它使用无人艇和武装水上摩托将俄罗斯的常规黑海舰队推离乌克兰海岸足够远,从而能继续向世界市场出口粮食和化肥。
These new technologies allow “the many and the small” — Iranians, Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas — “to slip the heavy punches of their opponents, because they are well hidden and can strike back with accurate blows of their own,” Arquilla said. The U.S. military, meanwhile, has just 11 big lumbering divisions and 11 carrier groups.
这些新技术使“为数众多但弱小”的一方——伊朗人、胡塞武装、真主党、哈马斯——能够“躲避对手的重拳,因为他们隐藏得很好,并能用自己的精确打击进行反击,”阿奎拉说。与此同时,美军仅有11个庞大笨重的师和11个航母群。
That is why defenders now have a real advantage over attackers, Arquilla concluded. Trump and Hegseth kept focusing on “scaling up the war” — adding more tempo and more tonnage — and the Iranians focused on “scaling out the war,” hiding small units with precision missiles in more places and attacking U.S. bases and Arab oil facilities all over the Gulf.
这就是为什么阿奎拉得出结论,防御方现在相对于进攻方拥有真正的优势。特朗普和海格塞斯一直专注于“扩大战争规模”——加快节奏和增加吨位,伊朗人则专注于“扩展战争范围”,在更多地点隐藏配备精确导弹的小型单位,并袭击整个海湾地区的美军基地和阿拉伯石油设施。
“Their job is to survive long enough to shoot and scoot. On land, a few big formations of Abrams tanks matter less than the many and the small with cheap weapons they can build and modify in a week,” Arquilla said.
“他们的任务是存活足够长时间,打完就跑。在陆地上,几支由艾布拉姆斯坦克组成的大型编队远不如那些能用一周时间制造和改装廉价武器的多个小型作战单位重要,”阿奎拉说。
These new weapons amplify another advantage the small have over the big: They don’t have to win. They just have to avoid losing. We have to win, end the war, go home and never look back. Good luck with that now.
这些新武器放大了小对大的另一个优势:他们不必取胜。他们只需避免失败。我们必须取胜,结束战争,回家,永不回头。现在做到这一点可就难了。
Before the Iranians and Hezbollah get too smug, though, they should remember the other half of my equation: While the small can now act really big, the big can now act really small. On the first day of the war, Israeli airstrikes with precision weapons — aided by U.S. intelligence — killed over 40 senior Iranian leaders gathered in a high-level leadership meeting in a single compound in Tehran. In other words, with precise information, Israel wiped out much of Iran’s national security elite with one shot.
不过,伊朗人和真主党也别过于自得,他们应记住我这个等式的另一半:小角色如今能做出大规模行动,大角色如今也能做出极小规模行动。开战第一天,在美军情报协助下,以色列使用精确制导武器发动空袭,在德黑兰一处高层领导会议场所击毙了40多名伊朗高级领导人。换言之,凭借精确信息,以色列一击致命,消灭了伊朗大批国家安全精英。
And then there was the Israeli pager attack on Hezbollah. On Sept. 17 and 18, 2024, Israel detonated the pagers and other hand-held electronic devices used by Hezbollah members, fighters, officers, medics and civilian supporters, killing dozens of people and wounding some 3,000 others. An estimated 1,500 Hezbollah fighters were reportedly put out of action because of injuries, mostly affecting their hands, faces and hips. Using a relatively small quantity of explosives and a huge dollop of information, Israel killed and wounded a significant number of Hezbollah fighters in a few hours.
此外还有以色列对真主党的寻呼机攻击。2024年9月17日和18日,以色列引爆了真主党成员、战斗人员、军官、医护人员和平民支持者使用的寻呼机及其他手持电子设备,造成数十人死亡,约3000人受伤。据报道,约1500名真主党战士因伤失去作战能力,主要伤及手部、面部和臀部。以色列用相对少量的炸药和大量的信息在几小时内杀伤了大批真主党战斗人员。
The U.S.-Israel Stuxnet attack on Iran’s Natanz enrichment facility that began in 2009 was another version of this. Instead of bombing the facility, the United States and Israel inserted a small computer worm — a few lines of code — to disable a big number of Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges, though the centrifuges were quickly replaced and the disruption was ultimately minimal. (The United States and Israel have never acknowledged responsibility for the virus.) That was the big acting small, using just malware, but you can bet that the development of that code, and the whole joint operation, cost a lot of money.
2009年开始的美以对伊朗纳坦兹浓缩设施的“震网”攻击也是另一种版本。美以并未轰炸该设施,而是植入了一个小型计算机蠕虫——几行代码,就使大量伊朗IR-1离心机瘫痪,不过离心机很快被更换,破坏效果最终甚微。(美以从未承认对该病毒负责。)这就是“大角色以小规模行动”,仅使用了恶意软件,但可想而知,开发该代码以及整个联合行动耗费了大量资金。
What is truly alarming today is how easy it is becoming for the small to act big — and by “small,” I don’t just mean in size, but also in age. A teenager with a laptop, a Starlink connection and an open-weight A.I. model can now disrupt a municipal water or power system by identifying and exploiting old software vulnerabilities.
如今真正令人警惕的是,小角色以大规模行动变得如此容易——这里的“小”不仅指规模,也指年龄。只要有笔记本电脑、星链连接和开源人工智能模型,一名青少年就能通过识别和利用旧软件漏洞破坏市政供水或电力系统。
So don’t be surprised if one day soon you hear your mayor sounding like Trump: “Turn my water back on, you crazy …”
所以,如果不久的某天你听到你的市长像特朗普那样说话,不要惊讶:“恢复我们的自来水,你们这些疯狂的……”
托马斯·L·弗里德曼(Thomas L. Friedman)是外交事务方面的专栏作者。他1981年加入时报,曾三次获得普利策奖。他著有七本书,包括赢得国家图书奖的《从贝鲁特到耶路撒冷》(From Beirut to Jerusalem)。欢迎在X和Facebook上关注他。
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