如果人工智能泡沫破裂,信用保险真的会赔付吗? | 经济学人财经(双语译文)


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In an AI blow-up, would insurance pay out?

如果人工智能泡沫破裂,信用保险真的会赔付吗?

英文部分选自经济学人20261031期财经版块

Finance & economics | Buttonwood

In an AI blow-up, would insurance pay out?

如果人工智能泡沫破裂,信用保险真的会赔付吗?

Credit default swaps are back in vogue amid fears of a debt disaster

随着市场对债务危机的担忧升温,信用违约互换重新受到投资者青睐。

注释:credit default swap (CDS):信用违约互换,一种信用衍生工具。信用保护买方向卖方支付费用,在约定信用事件发生时获得相应结算。

IN 1912 FRANZ REICHELT, a tailor and inventor, ascended to the first level of the Eiffel Tower to offer a demonstration. He had designed a suit which could double as a parachute. After mixed results with mannequins, he decided it was time for a manned test—and fell to a grisly end. Today owners of credit-default swaps (CDSs), a form of insurance designed to pay out when borrowers go bust, likewise find themselves in mid-air with an untested parachute.

1912年,裁缝兼发明家弗朗茨·赖歇尔特(FRANZ REICHELT)登上埃菲尔铁塔的第一层平台,准备进行一场公开演示。他设计了一套能够兼作降落伞的服装。在使用人体模型进行的测试中,结果有好有坏,于是他决定,是时候亲自上阵进行载人测试了——最终却惨烈地坠亡。如今,信用违约互换(CDS)的持有者也面临着类似的处境。CDS是一种旨在借款人违约时提供赔付的信用保护工具,而这些投资者仿佛正身处半空,身上背着一顶从未经受真正考验的降落伞。

CDSs can be used to hedge exposure to debt, or to speculate. But are they a good way to do either? The instruments gained notoriety in the global financial crisis of 2007-09, then got their wings clipped during the euro-zone debt crisis. In 2011 the Greek government’s initial restructuring of its debt failed to trigger CDS payouts. Although the contracts were eventually activated in 2012, by then many investors had lost faith. They lost more in 2014, after Portugal’s central bank split the failing Banco Espirito Santo in two and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) judged its CDSs to apply to the stronger offshoot. Some investors who held the old bank’s bonds faced huge losses—and Reichelt-like protection.

CDS既可以用于对冲债务风险敞口,也可以用于投机。但问题是,无论出于哪种目的,CDS真的是一种有效的工具吗?这类工具在2007—2009年全球金融危机期间声名狼藉,随后又在欧元区债务危机中遭受重挫。2011年,希腊政府首次实施债务重组时,并未触发CDS的赔付机制。尽管相关合约最终于2012年被激活,但到那时,许多投资者已经对其失去了信心。2014年,投资者的信心再次受到打击。当时,葡萄牙央行将陷入困境的圣灵银行(Banco Espírito Santo)拆分为两家机构,而国际掉期与衍生工具协会(ISDA)认定,相关CDS仅适用于拆分后财务状况较好的那家分支。结果,部分持有原银行债券的投资者遭受巨额损失,而他们购买的信用保护却如同赖歇尔特的降落伞一般——在最需要的时候未能提供预期的保障。

Despite these setbacks, the CDS is back in vogue. Concern over France’s public debt has driven the cost of related five-year CDSs to its highest in 14 years. In America the cost of insuring against a default in the next five years by Oracle, a cloud-computing giant going all-in on artificial-intelligence data centres, has quadrupled in the past 12 months. If the world’s mounting pile of debt comes crashing down, many CDS investors can expect a hard landing.

尽管经历了上述挫折,信用违约互换如今却重新受到市场追捧。市场对法国公共债务问题的担忧,已推动法国相关五年期CDS的保护成本升至14年来的最高水平。在美国,为防范甲骨文(Oracle)未来五年内违约而购买保险的成本,在过去12个月里翻了两番。甲骨文是一家全力押注人工智能数据中心的云计算巨头。如果全球不断累积的债务最终轰然崩塌,那么许多CDS投资者恐怕也难逃一次惨痛的坠落。

In some ways CDSs have been made less flaky. For example, changes to the terms of standard contracts in 2014 made it clear the redenomination of government debt into currencies other than the euro would count as a default, which was not explicit before. Bond exchanges, where an old liability is forcibly swapped for a new one more favourable to the borrower, also now count as a CDS-triggering default.

在某些方面,CDS已经变得没那么不靠谱了。例如,2014年对标准合约条款的修改明确规定,将政府债务重新计价为欧元以外的货币将算作违约,而此前这一点并不明确。债券置换——即旧债务被强制置换为对借款人更有利的新债务——如今也算作触发CDS赔付的违约事件。

But although some of the old holes have been patched up, new tears have appeared. Since the last big update to ISDA’s rules 12 years ago, corporate defaults have become as unfashionable as skinny jeans, thanks to furious legal innovation by firms facing bankruptcy, especially in America. Many now opt for liability-management exercises (LMEs), creative restructurings of their debts that avoid lengthy court battles. Since 2024 LMEs in America have outnumbered conventional defaults.

但尽管一些旧漏洞已被补上,新的裂口又出现了。自12年前ISDA规则上一次重大更新以来,企业违约已变得像紧身牛仔裤一样过时,原因在于面临破产的企业——尤其是在美国——疯狂的法律创新。如今许多企业选择负债管理操作(LMEs),即对其债务进行创造性的重组,以避开旷日持久的法庭争斗。自2024年以来,美国的LME数量已超过常规违约。

Investors waited months for a CDS payout after Altice France, a telecoms firm, announced an aggressive LME restructuring in 2024. Holders of CDSs covering the debt of Ardagh Group, a European packaging manufacturer, faced an even rockier ride after its LME in July the same year. Prices of Ardagh CDSs fell at first, when it appeared that they would not be triggered. The payouts eventually landed, but not before investors again began to question the swaps’ merit.

2024年,电信公司法国阿尔蒂斯(Altice France)宣布了一项激进的LME重组,投资者等了数月才等到CDS赔付。为欧洲包装制造商阿达集团(Ardagh Group)的债务提供保护的CDS持有者,在该公司同年7月进行LME之后,经历了更大的波折。阿达集团CDS的价格起初下跌,因为当时看来它们不会被触发。赔付最终到位,但此时投资者早已再次开始质疑这类互换工具的价值。

At least Altice and Ardagh are based in Europe, where restructuring is considered a credit event that can (in principle) trigger a CDS. Not so in North America, home to almost all of the AI companies being buffeted by the credit-market storm. The businesses making chips, building data centres and otherwise involved in the fast-moving AI economy are reaching for complicated financing arrangements. Their loans are backed by things like data-centre leases and “remaining performance obligations” (customers’ promises to pay them for computing capacity). Suppliers are lending money to their customers, sometimes while borrowing loads themselves. Such complexity is a recipe for a nasty and uncertain restructuring.

好在,阿尔蒂斯公司与阿达集团的总部均在欧洲。在欧洲,债务重组被视为一种信用事件,原则上可以触发CDS赔付机制。北美的情况却截然不同,而几乎所有身处信贷市场风暴中的人工智能企业都集中于此。无论是芯片制造商、数据中心搭建商,还是高速发展的人工智能经济产业链上的其他企业,都正纷纷采用复杂的融资安排。它们的贷款往往以数据中心租赁合同与“剩余履行义务”(remaining performance obligations,即客户承诺为获得算力而支付的费用)等作为支撑。与此同时,供应商也为客户提供融资,不过有时自身也大量举债。如此复杂的融资结构,极易导致一场棘手且结果难料的债务重组。

Defenders argue that CDSs still provide protection in the event of a default. The sophisticated investors who most commonly buy such products are often prepared for protracted legal battles and willing to weather the volatility.

CDS的支持者辩称,违约发生时,该合约仍能为投资者提供信用保护。常购买这类产品的投资老手,往往已做好应对漫长的法律纠纷的准备,也愿意承受市场波动带来的冲击。

This makes CDSs sound like resource-intensive bets on distressed debt in the mould of Oaktree Capital or Elliott Management. Yet that is not how they were envisaged. Their original purpose was to make it easier to hedge exposure to debt by offering a predictable payout in the event of non-payment. When the payout is no longer predictable—and requires investors to turn into Howard Marks or Paul Singer, the hard-charging founders of Oaktree and Elliott, respectively—CDSs look as threadbare as Reichelt’s wings. 

如此一来,CDS听起来倒更像是橡树资本(Oaktree Capital)或埃利奥特管理公司(Elliott Management)那种模式,对困境资源进行高资源投入型押注。然而,这并非CDS的设计初衷。它本是为了让投资者更从容地对冲债务风险敞口,具体而言,就是在债务人无法偿付时,提供可预期的赔付。一旦赔付不再有章可循,且要求投资者化身如橡树资本创始人霍华德·马克斯(Howard Marks)或埃利奥特管理公司创始人保罗·辛格(Paul Singer)那般雷厉风行的投资高手,CDS便看上去便如同赖歇尔特那套破旧降落伞一样,形同虚设。

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Ju1ian,男,经济学人爱好者

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vivifang,女,本人丰富,日新月异,无法简介


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