英伟达风波会打乱海湾国家的人工智能布局吗?
上周,黄仁勋卷入婚外情风波,英伟达随之陷入动荡,引发全球关注。
海湾国家的人工智能战略,与其对英伟达的投资及高端芯片的获取深度绑定,一旦英伟达未来战略发生重大转向,这些国家首当其冲。
2025年5月,特朗普出访海湾国家期间,阿联酋宣布将在阿布扎比建设一座5吉瓦的联合人工智能园区。项目建成后,将成为美国境外规模最大的同类设施,其核心为“星际之门阿联酋”(Stargate UAE)算力集群,规划算力达1吉瓦,由阿布扎比支持的G42联合多家美国企业共建,英伟达亦为合作方之一,负责供应Grace Blackwell芯片(GB300)。
英伟达还与沙特阿拉伯建立了牢固的商业联盟。去年11月,沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼访美期间,黄仁勋作为少数受邀的美国科技领袖之一,与王储会面。
访问期间,埃隆·马斯克宣布将与沙特政府支持的人工智能企业Humain合作,在当地建设一座搭载英伟达芯片、规模达500兆瓦的数据中心。
去年11月19日,特朗普在美沙特投资论坛接待穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼,黄仁勋与马斯克一同出席。
仅数小时后,美国商务部批准向G42和Humain出口至多35000颗英伟达Blackwell GB300芯片。当天早些时候,Humain宣布计划采购60万颗英伟达人工智能芯片。
上月,Humain与英伟达宣布进一步深化合作,计划分阶段在沙特部署约2.7万块图形处理器(GPU),以建成最高84兆瓦的人工智能算力集群。该项目预计于今年第四季度启动,并将从2027年年中起进入大规模部署阶段。
中东研究所(Middle East Institute)高级研究员穆罕默德·索利曼(Mohammed Soliman)指出,即便黄仁勋离任,英伟达与阿联酋及沙特的合作关系大概率不会动摇,但推进节奏可能放缓。索利曼的研究聚焦科技与地缘政治领域。
“现阶段英伟达与海湾国家的合作根基稳固,已形成制度化安排。与G42和Humain达成的协议均建立在既有的政府间协议之上。即便如此,黄仁勋本人的重要性不言而喻,他的离任势必带来影响。大方向虽不会改变,但失去这位核心推手,很多原定计划将搁置。”
卡内基国际和平研究院(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)科技与国际事务项目高级研究员萨姆·温特-莱维(Sam Winter-Levy)预计,英伟达领导层变动或将促使该公司在与海湾国家商业往来时更加谨慎。
“黄仁勋是英伟达面向主权国家推广人工智能算力的核心代言人,并与海湾各国领导人建立私人关系,短期内难以替代。”专注人工智能地缘政治研究的温特-莱维表示。
“我预计英伟达仍将履行与海湾国家已签署的合同,但会更重视合规、终端用途核查等环节,高调官宣新重大合作将有所减少。”
今年7月,美国放宽对阿联酋的出口限制,获批机构获取英伟达芯片以及其他先进技术的门槛有所降低。
海湾各国政府眼下更为迫切的担忧是:英伟达的动荡是否会使美国政府收紧先进芯片出口许可,进而拖慢该地区人工智能基建步伐。
这场风波为美国议员提供新筹码,他们正推动将多项芯片管控法案纳入本年度《国防授权法案》,包括《人工智能监管法案》、《芯片安全法案》和《硬件技术控制多边协同法案》。
上周,参议院民主党领袖查克·舒默(Chuck Schumer)敦促国会通过上述法案;众议院中国问题特别委员会主席约翰·穆勒纳尔(John Moolenaar)呼吁将芯片出口管制条款写入年度国防政策法案。
温特-莱维表示:“国会在这一领域的直接权限有限,出口许可权归行政部门,且本届政府已取消多项阻碍芯片输往阿联酋的许可要求。”
“不过,国会监督将抬高海湾国家新交易的政治成本。国会还可在《国防授权法案》这类法案中增设附加条款,例如芯片位置核验要求。”
芯片位置核验是一项技术监管手段,用于追踪图形处理器等先进芯片的物理位置,防止芯片被走私、转运至受制裁国家。
不过,美国商务部工业和安全局于本周一发布临时规定:企业若向全球任何数据中心出口、再出口或转让人工智能芯片和服务器,且该设备可能被22个受制裁国家使用,须事先申请许可。
温特-莱维表示:“此举释放出一个信号:一旦相关议题政治热度上升,美国政府随时可能出手,严厉打击芯片转移、远程租用算力行为。”
从长远来看,海湾国家受美国出口管制约束的风险正在上升。早在黄仁勋突然离任之前,民主党议员就已对美国政府给予海湾国家的优待政策表达反对。
索利曼表示:“美国方面大概率会出现更多反对声音,部分芯片交付可能延期、项目周期拉长。”
不过,温特-莱维也指出,海湾资本持续为美国本土人工智能基建“输血”,这反过来也让海湾国家掌握了一定的谈判筹码。
“这种依赖关系并非单向。如今海湾资本已成为美国人工智能建设的关键一环,这就是他们的筹码。如果美国企业依赖部署在海湾国家的大规模算力,海湾国家也能反过来牵制它们。不过,权力不对称性依旧突出:美国仅凭一纸监管通知,就能拖慢海湾国家的人工智能计划。”
归根结底,英伟达风波虽难以撼动海湾国家的人工智能雄心,却恰好暴露出这一雄心仍深度受制于美国政府与硅谷的决策。
阿联酋与沙特阿拉伯已斥巨资布局,力求跻身全球人工智能强国行列,但这些规划能否落地,取决于它们能否持续获取美国技术、维持美方的政治善意。
随着芯片出口审查日趋严格,两国面临的挑战,是在维持战略伙伴关系的同时,降低美国政治优先事项变动带来的风险。对海湾国家而言,问题早已不只是英伟达能否供货,而是美国政府是否批准出口许可。(财富中文网)
译者:中慧言-王芳
The downfall of Jensen Huang following revelations of extramarital affairs—including one involving a suspected Chinese spy—and the turmoil that has engulfed Nvidia in its wake have gripped the world’s attention over the past week.
Given their national AI ambitions are strongly tied to investments in Nvidia and access to its coveted chips, Gulf countries will be vulnerable to any dramatic changes in its future strategy.
During U.S. President Donald Trump’s Gulf tour in May 2025, the UAE unveiled plans to develop a 5-GW joint AI Campus in Abu Dhabi. Once complete, it will be the largest facility of its kind outside the U.S. At the heart of the project is Stargate UAE, a 1-GW computing cluster developed by Abu Dhabi-backed G42 in partnership with a host of U.S. companies, including Nvidia, which will supply its Grace Blackwell chips (GB300s).
Nvidia has also forged a strong commercial alliance with Saudi Arabia, with Huang among a select group of U.S. tech leaders invited to meet with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during his much-feted visit to the White House last November.
During the visit, Elon Musk announced a 500-MW data center in partnership with Saudi government-backed AI company, Humain, which will be powered by Nvidia’s computing chips.
Trump also hosted Mohammed bin Salman, alongside Huang and Elon Musk, at the U.S.-Saudi Investment Forum on November 19 last year.
Just hours later, the U.S. Commerce Department authorized the export of up to 35,000 Nvidia Blackwell GB300 chips to both G42 and Humain. Earlier in the day, Humain said it planned to purchase 600,000 Nvidia AI chips.
This relationship was deepened last month when Humain announced plans with Nvidia to deploy around 27,000 GPUs and develop up to 84-MW of AI computing capacity in the kingdom across a multi-phase program starting in the fourth quarter of this year and followed by planned large-scale deployments beginning in mid-2027.
While the existing partnerships Nvidia holds with the UAE and Saudi are unlikely to be threatened by Huang’s departure, it could weaken the relationship’s momentum, according to Mohammed Soliman, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, where he focuses on technology and geopolitics.
“The relationship with Nvidia is pretty solid and institutional at this point,” he said. “The deals with G42 and Humain sit on government-to-government agreements that were already in place. That said, Jensen matters a lot and his leaving will have an impact. The overall direction doesn’t change, but losing him as the main driver takes something off the table.”
Sam Winter-Levy, a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, expects that the change in leadership at Nvidia could make the company more circumspect in its business dealings with the Gulf.
“Huang was the public face of Nvidia’s sovereign AI pitch and had his own relationships with Gulf leaders, which will be hard to replace quickly,” said Winter-Levy, whose research focuses on the geopolitics of AI.
“I would assume Nvidia will honor its existing contracts with the Gulf, probably with more attention to compliance and things like end-use checks, but to make fewer splashy announcements of new deals.”
In July, Washington relaxed export restrictions on the UAE, granting approved organizations greater access to Nvidia chips and other advanced technologies.
For Gulf governments, a more immediate concern is whether the upheaval at Nvidia could make Washington more reluctant to approve further exports of advanced chips, thereby slowing the pace of the region’s AI buildout.
The upheaval has given U.S. lawmakers fresh ammunition to push for the inclusion of a series of chip-control bills, such as the AI Overwatch Act, the Chip Security Act and the MATCH Act, in this year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
Last week, Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer urged Congress to pass the bills, while House Select Committee on China Chairman John Moolenaar called for chip export controls to be included in the annual defense policy bill.
“Congress has limited direct power here, since export licenses lie with the executive branch, and the administration has removed many of the license requirements that slowed chip deliveries to the UAE in the past,” said Winter-Levy.
“But oversight raises the political cost of new Gulf deals, and Congress can attach conditions such as chip location verification to new bills like the NDAA.”
Chip location verification is a technical and regulatory method used to track the physical location of advanced processors—such as GPUs—to ensure they do not get smuggled or diverted to restricted countries.
However, on Monday, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, issued an interim rule that requires companies to obtain licenses to export, reexport, or transfer AI chips and servers to data centers anywhere in the world if the equipment could be used by a list of 22 embargoed countries, which includes China. The move aims to close a loophole that has allowed Chinese companies to lease Nvidia’s computing power from data centers in third countries.
“The new remote access rule primarily affects Gulf companies if they are renting large amounts of compute to Chinese-parented firms, but otherwise does not fundamentally change the situation for the UAE,” said Winter-Levy.
In the future, it seems increasingly likely that the Gulf will become more vulnerable to U.S. export controls given that, even before Huang’s abrupt departure, Democratic lawmakers had already pushed back against what they viewed as its preferential treatment. They frequently cited fears that China could obtain backdoor access to sensitive U.S. technology through the Gulf.
“There will probably be more political noise out of Washington that could slow some deliveries or stretch timelines,” said Soliman.
However, the region’s growing role in financing and supporting America’s AI infrastructure could also give the region some leverage in return, according to Winter-Levy.
“The dependence isn’t entirely one-way,” he said. “Gulf capital is now part of the American AI buildout, which gives them some leverage. And if U.S. companies come to rely on large quantities of compute housed in the Gulf, that will give the Gulf a degree of leverage over those companies. But the asymmetry is large, since Washington can slow the Gulf’s AI plans with a regulatory notice.”
Ultimately, Nvidia’s upheaval is unlikely to derail the Gulf’s AI ambitions, but it exposes just how dependent those ambitions remain on decisions made in Washington and Silicon Valley.
The UAE and Saudi Arabia have invested heavily in positioning themselves as global AI powerhouses, but their ability to deliver on those plans hinges on continued access to U.S. technology and political goodwill.
As scrutiny of chip exports intensifies, the challenge for both countries will be to maintain their strategic partnerships while reducing their exposure to shifting U.S. political priorities. For the Gulf, the question is no longer simply whether Nvidia can deliver the chips, but whether Washington will continue to let them.
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