The world is not a three-person table
Absences more important than presences
The most consequential feature of the diplomatic gathering in Shenzhen may not have been what the world’s most powerful leaders discussed, but who was absent when some of the most consequential conversations took place.
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit brought together leaders representing 21 member economies, a region central to global trade, investment and economic growth. Its broader agenda included strengthening regional economic integration, reducing trade barriers, improving connectivity and promoting economic cooperation amid rising protectionism and geopolitical tensions. Leaders from Japan, South Korea, Canada and Australia were among those attending. Yet, alongside this multilateral gathering, a separate diplomatic event captured international attention. Chinese President Xi Jinping, US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin held their first-ever trilateral summit at Kylin Villa in Shenzhen, meeting behind closed doors for roughly 80 minutes.
While 21 economies gathered to advance regional cooperation, three presidents held a separate meeting focused on global security and the international order. Their talks covered nuclear arms control and Ukraine, with Iran also featuring in the wider diplomatic discussions. Their four-point declaration addressed UN reform, energy supplies, state immunity and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and nuclear risk reduction.
This was more than a diplomatic alignment. It signalled a return to great-power politics, in which a handful of influential states seek to preserve stability by managing rivalries and negotiating their respective interests. The 19th-century Concert of Europe followed a similar model. Major powers consulted one another to maintain peace and protect their spheres of influence, while smaller states had little say in decisions that shaped their futures.
The international system established after World War II was intended to move beyond that model. The United Nations, international law and multilateral institutions created a common framework in which sovereignty would not depend entirely on military or economic strength. The system was never fully democratic. Five permanent members of the Security Council retained veto powers, institutionalising an unequal distribution of authority. Nevertheless, the post-war settlement established an important principle. International legitimacy should rest on rules and institutions, not simply on the preferences of powerful governments. Shenzhen raises uncomfortable questions about how much of that principle survives.
The declaration’s omissions are particularly revealing. Although Ukraine was discussed, the joint statement made no reference to Russia’s continuing war there. Nor did it address the conflict involving Iran. Instead, the document emphasised energy cooperation, nuclear risk reduction, UN reform and the jurisdiction of international courts. These are important subjects, but the absence of explicit commitments on the conflicts testing international security exposes the distance between diplomatic declarations and the difficult compromises required to achieve peace.
Shenzhen may eventually be remembered as the beginning of a new channel between three nuclear powers. That would be welcome. Communication among governments possessing the world's most destructive weapons is essential. But peace cannot become an exclusive arrangement negotiated by those with the greatest capacity to wage war. Nor can international stability mean that powerful states enjoy greater freedom to determine the rules while weaker countries bear the consequences.
There is also a deeper contradiction. The three governments endorsed reforming the United Nations while emphasising state immunity and raising concerns about the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Reforming international institutions is necessary. But reform should strengthen their ability to uphold international law, not make powerful governments less answerable to it. An international system in which states invoke sovereignty to resist accountability while exercising power beyond their borders risks turning international law into a privilege rather than a universal standard.
For Xi, the summit showcased China’s growing diplomatic influence. Hosting the US and Russian presidents allowed Beijing to present itself as a global power broker, not merely an economic rival to Washington. The meeting itself, regardless of its outcomes on Ukraine or Iran, reinforced China’s diplomatic standing. Putin gained a different advantage. Appearing alongside Trump and Xi projected Russia’s continued international relevance despite its confrontation with the West. For Moscow, a place at the table of global security negotiations was itself a diplomatic gain.
Trump, meanwhile, could present personal engagement with two major rivals as an alternative to the institutional diplomacy he frequently criticises. His preference for leader-to-leader negotiations reflects his belief that personal relationships and political bargaining can overcome diplomatic deadlock. But relationships can open diplomatic doors. They cannot guarantee that agreements will survive changing interests, domestic pressures or future political crises.
The consequences extend well beyond the three capitals. European governments have reason to worry about the future of Ukraine being discussed without Kyiv having a place at the table. Japan, South Korea and other Asian economies must consider how Washington, Beijing and Moscow might negotiate security arrangements affecting their neighbourhood. Smaller countries depend on international rules precisely because they lack the military and economic weight to protect their interests through direct bargaining with major powers.
For Pakistan, the implications are not abstract. Its economic relationship with China, security and diplomatic ties with the United States, and interests across a politically volatile region make it vulnerable to shifts in great-power priorities. Islamabad cannot assume that close relations with any one capital will guarantee protection of its interests when larger powers negotiate among themselves. Its long-term security requires diplomatic balance, economic resilience and an international system in which rules apply to powerful states as well as weaker ones.
Middle powers must reconsider their place in international politics. The answer is not to create rival blocs or retreat into isolation. It is to strengthen multilateral institutions, build coalitions and make international agreements more transparent and accountable. Countries such as Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia and European states possess considerable diplomatic and economic influence when they coordinate their positions. Their collective voice matters because the international system cannot remain legitimate if its future is negotiated exclusively by its most powerful members.
Shenzhen may eventually be remembered as the beginning of a new channel between three nuclear powers. That would be welcome. Communication among governments possessing the world's most destructive weapons is essential. But peace cannot become an exclusive arrangement negotiated by those with the greatest capacity to wage war. Nor can international stability mean that powerful states enjoy greater freedom to determine the rules while weaker countries bear the consequences.
The world is not a three-person table. Its future cannot be negotiated by three presidents or three competing visions of power. An international order deserves legitimacy only when those expected to live by its rules also have a meaningful voice in shaping them.
内容来自 Pakistan Today,版权归原作者所有。
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