Why are there two Pakistans?
Pakistan’s political history has been shaped by competing visions of national identity, as political movements and the establishment continue to struggle over who defines the country’s political direction and constitutional character.
Treading dangerous terrain
The headline above is itself controversial on the count that political movements in Pakistan and the embedded establishment have tended to define their perception of the country as what they call their specific version of Pakistan. The conflict between the two has been what is the punchline of defining or analyzing the political history of Pakistan.
However; the political history does not work in isolation; rather it has tended to define the economic, administrative, political and even security parameters of the state. Which faction in the corridors of power and in the street had the imagination to take the people along has its day, while the other has waited. Right from the availability of a constitutional document; even for ceremonial purposes; to the purchase list of the weapon systems, opting for heavy industry or the market economy; all has been the handiwork of the factors mentioned above.
However to quote Amir Taher’si book on Iran The Spirit Of God, in which he laments the fact that in the 1970s, there were two Irans; the one where young couples courted each other in French, where economists made their point through a jugglery of facts and figures, where government through its media strived hard to prove that the ‘emperor has clothes’ in a sort of ‘positive reporting’; there was another Iran that was not represented anywhere; which incidentally took the world by surprise in 1979 and is refusing to cede it again to the ‘despised world’ again.
The balance sheet of both the Pakistans reflects that the decision-making powers of the second Pakistan have progressively disillusioned the disfranchised first Pakistan. That passing of the economic decision-making disaster made by the second Pakistan to the first Pakistan regretfully can be the undoing of the state itself on the single count that the state is at war with itself due to the decision-making mechanisms. Conclusively the return to the fold is the best way, if not forward, but to a correction initiative; not taken by the rotten structures but by the people themselves; the Turkish and Iranian way; customized for the South Asian psyche
Practically that incidence of two separate worlds within a state is not exclusive to Iran alone; many transitional societies from rural to urban go through that experience until they settle down somewhere. The Turkish regimentation, courtesy the fallout of the First World War in the form of Kemalist movement; eventually way to the Erdogan movement; the basic difference between the two was nothing but two separate worlds.
In such a scheme of things, it is no surprise that there exist two Pakistans side by side; who meet each other out of duress or need to talk, otherwise they are as divorced from each other as an estranged couple. How that existence has shaped the path the Pakistani state has taken, needs to be discussed.
From the days of independence to date; the vanguard of any political movement including the electoral freedom struggle has been spearheaded by the Pakistanis, the inhabitants of the first Pakistan; who live simply and their enjoyments, happiness and vice versa are different from the other Pakistan, the second Pakistan. If in those days the first Pakistan relieved itself by playing hockey, cricket or football; the second Pakistan was more at ease with tombola, golf and similar such games which were identified with the colonial elite, foremost amongst them the colonial armed forces.
Touching the raw nerve; that very colonial elite was the inspiration of the second Pakistan. Consequently, the military and civil bureaucracy found it necessary to maintain that lifestyle. The only way to maintain that lifestyle was to seek alignment with the same elite in the western capitals, create common cause and arrange a stream of economic match making and consequent dependence.
Here comes the twist of the story. The first Pakistan lifestyle is at odds with the second Pakistan lifestyle. That lifestyle starts from the choice of what to eat and what to adopt.
Dissecting the dichotomy one by one; Pakistan was an agricultural country when it gained independence from the British. Logic demanded that it should tread the path of economic growth through the comparative advantages it had at that time. Sense prevailed in the case of jute in East Pakistan, where sense prevailed and Pakistan emerged as a credible international supplier.
However, the overall policy was at odds with what the country had in its ‘default settings’. The economic managers team led by late Dr. Mahbub ul Haque went for export-led growth based on industrial development at the cost of agricultural innovation. Despite the fact that the political system, a mix of civil and military bureaucracy, made a few cosmetic acts to show that it believed in a balanced economic growth strategy, the fact remained that the key strategy was to bridge what the economists call the import and export gap and the saving and investment gap. Towards that goal it was imperative that the import gap is inflated and then filled up through the export of industrial goods like cement. That strategy worked for only a five-year period between 1960 and 1965. Later the geopolitical imperatives ruined whatever chances there might have been to restore that. During that period, the much-neglected agricultural sector provided the much-needed relief by providing ‘food security’.
The faulty economic strategy precipitated a political crisis which culminated in the dismemberment of the country. However, by that time the dividing lines between the two Pakistans were clear to view and decide. The first Pakistan was to become the human fodder for the electoral exercises tuned to elect or select the elite in a way that the combined interests of the civil and military bureaucracy and the temporary tenure political elite matched. In a way the second Pakistan prospered at the expense of the first Pakistan. With the strengthening of that alliance, it was all natural that the economic strategies were tuned to support the elite; whether it was the banking sector; the laws framed by the civil bureaucracy. That arrangement led to the return to the same import-based strategy.
The import-based strategy not only brought a policy ill-suited for a country like Pakistan, but also brought in a lifestyle which was alien to the prevalent practices in the Pakistani society. A test case for that is the way people tend to eat and plan their diet patterns. In a country like Pakistan, where without soyabean, every house had the mechanism to make what is now popularly referred to as ‘desi ghee’; the emphasis on soyabean means an inflated import bill which was avoidable.
Likewise, as of today the pasteurized milk and dairy products go to a much smaller section of society. Much of the households all over Pakistan depend upon what is called the ‘gawala milk’ and the yogurt traditionally made by the milk seller. However, a section of the public, the elite, prefers packaged milk, which depends upon imported dry milk, whose prices depend on international prices. When they escalate, so do escalate the prices of the final product. Likewise, a common man in the distant street of Pakistan is fine with dahi-bhallay and can satisfy his taste buds or hunger with a samosa; but the elite prefers a pastry or a donut.
The examples referred to above might look trivial but they ahow that the lifestyles of the two Pakistans are at odds. The first Pakistan’s import bills and expenditures are minimal and rather that Pakistan saves the import bills through a constant supply of fruits and vegetables, courtesy the ‘food security support’. The second Pakistan, depending on imports, creates the foreign exchange gap for no productive reason.
However, the story does not end here. The maintenance of the elite state triggers reforms by the creditors imposed on the economy and the country. The withdrawal of subsidy hits that first Pakistan head-on, while it has not contributed directly to the inflated bill in imports. Likewise, the food security goes waste as the logistic prices are inflated due to the creditor interventions. In other words, the advantages are turned into disadvantages due to the misguided policies.
The balance sheet of both the Pakistans reflects that the decision-making powers of the second Pakistan have progressively disillusioned the disfranchised first Pakistan. That passing of the economic decision-making disaster made by the second Pakistan to the first Pakistan regretfully can be the undoing of the state itself on the single count that the state is at war with itself due to the decision-making mechanisms. Conclusively the return to the fold is the best way, if not forward, but to a correction initiative; not taken by the rotten structures but by the people themselves; the Turkish and Iranian way; customized for the South Asian psyche.
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