Pakistan’s New Alliances: Regional Power or Military Advantage?
Will Bangladesh join the Makkah Pact?
Dhaka should put the same question to itself. Before it walks into a room where the army appears to hold the pen, and where Delhi is watching from next door, it ought to be able to say what Bangladesh gains that it cannot already get at homePakistan’s headlines of this autumn might make us think they come from two different countries. In one, the prime minister stands in Makkah beside the Saudi crown prince and the Turkish president as a new military alliance is signed. In the other, an entire province is under emergency rule, and fuel prices are still the first thing people grumble about at the dinner table. Which of the two says more about Shehbaz Sharif’s standing? I think you need both, and neither is as kind to him as it first looks. There is a third picture too. In Dhaka, ministers say they would view an invitation to the pact in a positive light. In Delhi, the foreign ministry says it is watching.
What Pakistan has signed
On 7 August, Sharif, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan put their names to the Makkah defence pact. The core is that an attack on any is an attack on all. Pakistan’s foreign minister insists the pact is purely defensive and open to other countries. A political and defence committee has been set up to work on interoperability, joint exercises, joint production and counterterrorism coordination. The text itself is thin. It says nothing about whether Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is covered, and no official has ruled that out.
On October 5, the promise turned real. After repeated Houthi strikes on Saudi infrastructure, the three governments agreed to “rapid deployment” of forces to the kingdom. Pakistan was already there, with roughly 8,000 troops, a JF-17 squadron, drones and an HQ-9 air defence system. Its defence minister has spoken of a supporting role, reconnaissance rather than front-line fighting, and Islamabad has dismissed reports of 30,000 to 40,000 troops as “speculative”. Turkey has sent the agreement to its parliament, and one report says it would bind Ankara for at least 10 years.
None of this came out of nowhere. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a bilateral mutual defence agreement in September 2025, and Makkah simply widens that umbrella. On 27 August, Defence Minister Khawaja Asif also signed a five-year protocol with Kuwait covering training, capacity building, border management and intelligence cooperation. Pakistan’s defence ministry describes it as an extension of a 2023 agreement, and officials said it is not linked to any other arrangement.
The newest signature is different. On October 21,Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan and Indonesia had signed the Badr Memorandum of Understanding in Doha. Unlike Makkah, it is not a promise to fight for one another. It is an industrial arrangement. The four countries say they will expand military production, joint research, technology sharing and technical training, and pool their defence manufacturing to meet the needs of ‘allied and friendly nations’. Haluk Gorgun, who heads Turkey’s Defence Industry Presidency, said it should turn the partners’ complementary strengths into concrete projects.
Ankara’s procurement agency frames it as a way to bring its separate defence industry partnerships with Qatar, Pakistan and Indonesia under one multilateral roof. For Pakistan, the existing example is the Babur-class corvette project with Turkey. For Qatar, the timing matters too, since it has said it will soon announce a local defence production hub.Badr seems like the commercial leg of a larger structure. Makkah is the pledge, and Badr is where the factories come in.
Dhaka should put the same question to itself. Before it walks into a room where the army appears to hold the pen, and where Delhi is watching from next door, it ought to be able to say what Bangladesh gains that it cannot already get at home.
Then there is the other hat Pakistan wears. It is also the go-between for Washington and Tehran. Islamabad brokered the 8 April ceasefire and a memorandum signed in June, whose 60-day window lapsed in mid-August without an extension. Pakistani CDF Field Marshal Asim Munir was in Tehran again recently, his fifth visit by Al Jazeera’s count since the ceasefire, and he raised the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia as well. A Saudi shield in one hand and an Iranian channel in the other is a hard thing to hold steady, and it gets harder every week.
Quiet abroad, restless at home
While the diplomats flew around, the opposition marched. Imran Khan’s PTI began a long march towards Islamabad on October 4, and Sharif urged it to stop, warning it would damage the economy. A week later the federal government imposed emergency and governor’s rule in PTI-run KP.
The rift probably was because of disagreements over counterterrorism operations and talks with the Afghan Taliban. Parliament later ratified the measures for two months, and the information minister has suggested a formal ban on the PTI may no longer be necessary,
Dhaka’s question, Delhi’s watch
Bangladesh is not a bystander. Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman told Parliament that Dhaka views the pact positively and would have to consider an invitation if one came. He added that there was no reason for others to be concerned if the pact expanded. State Minister for Foreign Affairs Humayun Kabir said Bangladesh saw no risk in joining and that it would not restrict ties with other partners. A second state minister for Foreign Affairs, Shama Obaed Islam, struck a more careful note on September 1, saying Dhaka was still assessing the situation and had received no formal invitation.
The record is not tidy. A foreign ministry source told Reuters that Saudi Arabia had invited Dhaka, without saying when, while the foreign secretary, Asad Alam Siam, told he was not aware of any invitation or decision to join. That is where things stood in early September.
Delhi has been watching. India’s foreign ministry said on the day of signing that it was closely following the development. On 11 August it said it was examining the implications and would take all necessary measures to protect its national interests. Asked later about Bangladesh’s interest, spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said only that India was following developments closely. Reuters noted that joining could complicate Dhaka’s ties with India.
Opinion in Dhaka is divided. An Asia Times analysis argues that Pakistan is one of the pact’s three pillars and that its defining rivalry is with India, while Bangladesh’s water, trade and border-security interests are far more tied up with India than with Riyadh, Ankara or Islamabad. It asks what specific security threat joining would answer that Bangladesh’s existing bilateral relationships cannot. A former ambassador, Mahfuzur Rahman, told PTI that such an accord could matter to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey but is not essential in any way for Bangladesh. Others see an opening. Prof Shahab Enam Khan told a roundtable that Bangladesh could benefit from joining if it prepares diplomatically and builds political consensus at home. Riyadh, for its part, has said the pact is not a military alliance or a religious bloc and does not involve nuclear pursuits or an arms race.
So who is really gaining?
The regional-power case is real. Pakistan has nuclear weapons, a large army and, now, a seat at nearly every table that matters in the Gulf. It was the only state in the region to condemn the strikes on Iran, which bought it credibility in Tehran. For a country that spent years being treated as an IMF case file, being courted by Riyadh, Ankara and Washington all at once is no small thing. It is also why Delhi is paying attention. The Badr MoU adds an industrial angle: Pakistan has an established defence production sector covering aircraft, naval vessels and armoured vehicles, and now has a four-nation framework in which to sell and share it.
But look at who holds the pen. The 27th Amendment, passed with 234 votes in the National Assembly, created the post of Chief of Defence Forces, and Field Marshal Munir was named to it for five years. Some analysts \went as far as calling the army chief effectively unassailable. Since then, the pact’s weightiest decisions have run through the military.
Some argument is blunter. Each external win, one media outlet says, works as temporary life support for the establishment. However, there is nothing to show that these pacts were designed to quiet protesters, and reporters tied the governor’s rule to a long dispute over terrorism and Afghan policy, not to Saudi Arabia.
Where does that leave Shehbaz? Slightly better off, but mostly on borrowed terms. He gets the Makkah photograph and a story about a Pakistan that matters again. He also gets the fuel bills, the emergency in Peshawar, and the blame if an alliance he signed drags the country into someone else’s war.
Too many pacts?
Probably, or at least too many for the room Pakistan has to manoeuvre in. ThePrint, an Indian outlet, argues that Islamabad is stretched across militancy at home, tension with Afghanistan and its ties with Iran. An analyst said that Pakistan’s credibility as both a Saudi partner and a Tehran interlocutor would be harder to sustain if the pact turned explicitly anti-Iran. Badr and Makkah are separate instruments, but each adds to the list of commitments Islamabad has to manage. Even the machinery looks unfinished. One opinion piece recalls the Foreign Office saying the pact was “not operational yet” and the foreign minister suggesting full operation could take about a year, which it describes as a pact announced before it was built.
So, regional power or home advantage? Pakistan is chasing both, and the two goals are not as separate as they sound. The deeper question is who gets to decide where the commitments end, and whether anyone elected will be in the room when they are tested.
Dhaka should put the same question to itself. Before it walks into a room where the army appears to hold the pen, and where Delhi is watching from next door, it ought to be able to say what Bangladesh gains that it cannot already get at home.
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