Smoke, mirrors, and fake maps

The theatre of territorial reform

When the economy tanks, poverty sits stubbornly at 28.9 percent, and governance completely collapses, Pakistan’s ruling elite reaches for the oldest trick in the book: they pull out a box of crayons and try to redraw the map.

The sudden resurrection of the new provinces debate, complete with hand-waving about nationwide referendums, a secret 28th Constitutional Amendment, and sweeping administrative overhauls isn’t reform but a masterclass in distraction. Strip away the political theatre, and you find zero constitutional roadmaps, zero financial blueprints, and zero consensus. It’s a smokescreen designed to keep you looking everywhere except where the actual fire is.

Look no further than Islamabad itself. The federal capital hasn’t had an elected local government since February 2021, thumbing its nose at a strict 120-day legal deadline through endless delays and legal acrobatics. Even when elections limped toward a December schedule, the state actively sabotaged them by blocking teachers from polling duties, forcing the High Court to pull the plug once again. When a government can’t even tolerate democracy within its own municipal backyard, pitching grand blueprints for a dozen new provinces is pure comedy.

Yet the ruling coalition insists on gazing upward at grand cartographic illusions. While the interior minister floats referendums and the defence minister casually tosses around numbers like 12 new administrative units, a government utterly incapable of managing municipal elections in its own direct backyard invites the nation to swallow a total structural redesign. Is this really how a republic debates its foundational architecture?

Not through rigorous parliamentary committees or white papers, but via casual talk-show soundbites and trial balloons, treating the map of Pakistan like a script for a nightly drama. The contradiction is as glaring as it is insulting, a regime that cannot organize a single local council presumes to turn statehood into a soap opera.

Pakistan’s crisis is not that its provinces are too large, but that power is locked in provincial capitals. Under Article 140A, provinces are constitutionally bound to devolve authority to local bodies yet a recent task force found that zero provinces comply. With 80 percent of local budgets swallowed by salaries, and a paltry Rs1.8 trillion trickling down out of Rs9.2 trillion in projected federal transfers for FY2026-27, power remains hoarded at the top. A bureaucrat miles away in a provincial secretariat still decides if a single school in Dera Ghazi Khan gets a teacher.

Splitting provinces under this status quo does nothing to bring the state closer to the people, it merely multiplies secretariats, chief secretaries, and elite perks, shifting a bloated central monopoly from one capital to another. The question facing Pakistan is not how many provincial capitals it can afford to build, but how much actual authority ordinary citizens can wield over the institutions that shape their daily lives.

It needs elected governments at the local level, where citizens can see who makes decisions, where public money goes and whom to hold accountable. Unsurprisingly, that is the very reform they will never do, having postponed it for far too long. This smoky debate is designed to blur than to build, and when the fog clears, another convenient distraction will inevitably emerge from the theatre, leaving new provinces exactly where they started, a convenient fiction.

The constitutional position is equally important. Article 239 requires a constitutional amendment to secure a two-thirds majority of the total membership of both houses of Parliament. Where the amendment alters provincial boundaries, it must also receive a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the affected provincial assembly. Article 48(6) allows a referendum on a matter of national importance after approval by a joint sitting of Parliament. But a referendum cannot replace the requirements of Article 239. Even an overwhelming public vote in favour of dividing a province would not remove the need for approval by its assembly. 

This raises an obvious question. If the constitutional procedure is already clear, what purpose would a referendum serve? It could gauge public opinion, but it cannot itself create a province. The proposal needs to be accompanied by a clear explanation of its constitutional purpose and political feasibility. Pakistan’s experience with referendums in 1984 and 2002 also makes it necessary to distinguish genuine public consultation from exercises designed to confer political legitimacy on decisions already favoured by those in power.

Then there is the matter of timing, which gives the game away completely. Debating abstract cartography is infinitely easier than governing through crisis. Why confront the grim reality of the Kohat ambush where ten policemen were recently gunned down, or tens of millions of citizens trapped in poverty, when the ruling elite can manufacture a loud, consequence-free debate over provincial lines instead?

A second possibility is political leverage. The PPP has consistently opposed dividing Sindh, while other political actors have advocated new administrative units. Raising the prospect of a referendum can put pressure on coalition partners and force political parties to clarify positions they might prefer to leave ambiguous. Even so, the political implications of the proposal cannot be ignored.

There is also a fiscal question that has received little attention. New provinces would require administrative infrastructure, public institutions and a clear system for distributing revenues and liabilities. The existing National Finance Commission framework would need careful consideration. Before inviting the country to debate new boundaries, the government should explain how additional administrative units would be financed and whether they would improve service delivery or merely expand the cost of government.

There is nothing inherently wrong with creating new provinces. Large populations, geographical distance, administrative neglect and persistent regional disparities can provide legitimate grounds for reconsidering provincial arrangements. But such a proposal requires evidence, political consensus, constitutional compliance and a credible financial plan. None can be replaced by slogans or a referendum announcement.

Pakistan needs local governments with clearly defined responsibilities and financial autonomy. Mayors and council heads should be directly elected, their terms protected against arbitrary dissolution, and their institutions guaranteed a predictable share of provincial resources. Primary education, basic healthcare, water supply, sanitation and local infrastructure should be placed under accountable local authorities, supported by independent audits and public oversight.

Redrawing a map can be done in a morning. Building democratic institutions that answer to citizens takes years of commitment. More importantly, it requires those in power to surrender authority, an action they simply refuse to take. Pakistan does not need more provincial capitals merely to reproduce the centralisation that has weakened existing institutions.

It needs elected governments at the local level, where citizens can see who makes decisions, where public money goes and whom to hold accountable. Unsurprisingly, that is the very reform they will never do, having postponed it for far too long. This smoky debate is designed to blur than to build, and when the fog clears, another convenient distraction will inevitably emerge from the theatre, leaving new provinces exactly where they started, a convenient fiction.

内容来自 Pakistan Today,版权归原作者所有。

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